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Recent changes to the way the U.S. Department of Justice decides whether to pursue
capital charges have made it more likely that the federal death penalty will be sought in cases in
which the criminal conduct occurred within States that do not authorize capital punishment for
any crime. As a result, since 2002, five people have been sentenced to death in federal court for
conduct that occurred in States that do not authorize the death penalty. This state of affairs is in
serious tension with the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and unusual
punishments.” A complete understanding of the Bill of Rights can be achieved only by placing
primary emphasis on the views of the Anti-Federalists, who conditioned ratification of the
Constitution on the inclusion of such a Bill. Such an account of the Bill of Rights recognizes
that, with respect to most if not all of its provisions, “structural” and “individual rights”
concerns are intertwined. That is, these provisions tie the protection of individual rights to the
preservation of State sovereignty from the danger of federal encroachment. In particular, recent
scholarship suggests that the criminal procedure protections of the Bill were in large part
motivated by a desire on the part of the Anti-Federalists to make it more difficult for the federal
government to investigate, prosecute, convict, and punish for crime, traditionally a prerogative
of the States. It follows from this that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and unusual
punishments” was designed primarily to restrain the federal power to punish in a way that
conflicts with the norms of an individual State. Thus, the imposition of the death penalty by the
federal government in any State that does not impose that mode of punishment constitutes “cruel
and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
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WHEN THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY IS “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL”
by
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer
The death sentence imposed on Gary Sampson on January 29, 2004 in Massachusetts1 must
have come as quite a surprise to many people in that State. After all, the State had not had a death
penalty statute on the books since 1984,2 and no one had been executed there in nearly six decades.3
Nevertheless, Sampson was eligible for, and ultimately received, a sentence of death because he was
tried, convicted, and sentenced in federal court, and the federal death penalty statutes make no
distinction between defendants tried in districts located in States that have the death penalty and
those tried in districts located in States that do not. Such a distinction has been largely unnecessary
because, until recently, local federal prosecutors, when deciding whether to seek the death penalty,
heavily weighed the local feelings about the death penalty, and generally did not seek the ultimate
sanction where the State had no provision for the death penalty. Recently, however, the Attorney
General has decided to overrule such decisions in a number of cases in an effort to make the death
penalty more uniform throughout the nation. As a result, five federal defendants since 2002 have
been sentenced to die in federal court for crimes committed within States that do not authorize capital
punishment for any crime.

1

See
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2004/01/29/sampson_receives_states_first_federal_death_
sentence/ (last viewed June 8, 2005).
2

See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 128 (Mass. 1984) (striking down state’s death penalty

law).
3

The last execution in Massachusetts occurred on May 9, 1947, when Philip Bellino and Edward Gertson
were executed for murder. See Brian Hauck et al., Capital Punishment Legislation in Massachusetts, 36 Harv. J. on
Legis. 479, 482 & n.24 (1999).
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This Article argues that such efforts by the Attorney General to achieve national uniformity
are not only misguided but are also unconstitutional. Specifically, it argues that the Eighth
Amendment’s proscription of “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibits the federal government
from imposing a sentence of death in any State that does not itself impose that punishment. While
certainly novel, this proposition is faithful to the vision of the Anti-Federalist proponents of the Bill
of Rights, by imposing an important constraint on the central government and reposing ultimate
authority in the people of the several States to decide whether a particular mode of punishment is
acceptable within their respective borders. Moreover, this proposed rule relies on two well accepted
principles of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. First, this rule is addressed to the constitutionality of
a mode of punishment, and while the current Justices on the Supreme Court are in wide disagreement
over whether and to what extent the Eight Amendment forbids disproportionate punishments, all
agree that it does address whether particular modes of punishment pass constitutional muster. And,
second, the proposed rule relies solely on objective and readily ascertainable evidence regarding the
acceptability of the death penalty – whether the people of a State have indeed accepted it – and while
some Justices believe that the Court is required to go beyond the objective evidence in determining
whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual,” all agree that such objective evidence must be given
first priority.
Part I of this Article looks at the federal death penalty and its recent application to
defendants who committed crimes in States that do not authorize capital punishment. Part II reviews
the Supreme Court’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence on “cruel and unusual
punishments,” distilling four main principles from that jurisprudence: that those Amendments
prohibit punishments not authorized by law; that they forbid certain modes of punishment; that they
prohibit non-capital punishments that are grossly disproportionate to the crime; and that they
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categorically bar certain classes of offenses and offenders from receiving capital punishment. Part
III looks at the Eighth Amendment from an Anti-Federalist point of view. This Part advances the
view of the criminal procedure protections of the Bill of Rights, not as assuring the general fairness
and reliability of the federal criminal process, but as creating obstacles to the investigation,
prosecution, conviction, and punishment of persons for federal crimes. This view treats the
protection of criminal defendants at the federal level as intimately intertwined with the protection of
state prerogatives in addressing crime, and treats the Eighth Amendment as a particular embodiment
of this interconnectedness of individual and collective rights.
Part IV recovers the original Eighth Amendment from the alloy that has been produced by
mixing it with the Fourteenth in the crucible of incorporation. This Part re-examines the principles
of current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in light of the Anti-Federalist approach to the Bill of
Rights and distills the key principle of the Eighth Amendment in its pure form, unmediated by the
demands of the Fourteenth: the prohibition of particular modes of punishment, as informed by the
use of inter-jurisdictional comparisons of punishments for identical or similar crimes. This Part then
proposes that the Eighth Amendment be read as restraining the federal power to utilize a particular
mode of punishment, including the death penalty, when that power conflicts with the norms of an
individual State. Finally, this Part discusses possible objections to this approach.
I. THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
The federal government has always exacted death as the price for the most serious crimes.
Only recently, however, as a result of the process of federalization of crime, has the federal death
penalty covered so many crimes that traditionally were left to the States to punish. Even more
recently, the Department of Justice has instituted policies to increase national uniformity in the
imposition of the death penalty. The result of the confluence of these two trends is that five current
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prisoners on federal death row committed their crimes in States thatdo not authorize capital
punishment.
A.

History and Scope of the Federal Death Penalty
Shortly after the First Congress approved the Bill of Rights, it drafted a federal crime bill

that attached the penalty of death by hanging to several of the crimes it created.4 Among the capital
crimes created were treason, murder on federal land, forgery, uttering forged securities,
counterfeiting, and various offenses, including piracy, committed on the high seas.5 In 1897,
Congress reduced the number of capital crimes to five.6 Although the death penalty was expanded
over the next several decades, only thirty-four people were executed by the federal government from
1927 through 1963.7
The federal government was effectively without a death penalty for 16 years after the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia8 ushered in a new era of death penalty
jurisprudence.9 While several pre-Furman statutes continued to authorize the death penalty for some

4

See Christopher Q. Cutler, Death Resurrected: The Reimplementation of the Federal Death Penalty, 23
Seattle U.L. Rev. 1189, 1193 (2000); Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts about
the Department of Justice's Role, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 347, 349, 360, 365 (1999) [hereinafter Little, History]; Rory
K. Little, The Future of the Federal Death Penalty, 26 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 529, 538 (2000) [hereinafter Little,
Future].

5

See Cutler, supra note 4, at 1193; Little, History, supra note 4, at 362-63; Little, Future, supra note 4, at

538.
6

See Cutler, supra note 4, at 1195; Little, History, supra note 4, at 367; Little, Future, supra note 4, at 538.

7

See Cutler, supra note 4, at 1193; George Kannar, Federalizing Death, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 325, 329 (1996);
Little, History, supra note 4, at 370; Little, Future, supra note 4, at 539.
8

408 U.S. 232 (1972).

9

See Little, History, supra note 4, at 349.
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federal crimes, these statutes were likely unconstitutional because they did not provide for
procedures the Supreme Court had announced were required by the Eighth Amendment.10
However, the federal government re-introduced the death penalty with the Anti-Drug
Abuse and Death Penalty Act of 1988, also known informally as the Drug Kingpin Act,11 which
“added the death penalty for a very narrow realm of cases in which murder resulted from a drug
related offense.”12 The federal government greatly expanded the scope of the death penalty in 1994
with the Federal Death Penalty Act (“FDPA”),13 “a revolution for federal capital punishment.”14
The “FDPA substantially increased the availability of the death penalty for federal offenders” by:
creating several new death-eligible crimes; authorizing the death penalty for several pre-existing
federal crimes; and detailing the procedures to be employed for pre-existing statutes that already
provided for the death penalty but that were likely unconstitutional after Furman.15 Although the
number of new death-eligible federal offenses is “ open to interpretation,’”16 by most counts the
FDPA created sixty capital crimes.17 Moreover, other than “treason against the federal government

10

See Sandra D. Jordan, Death for Drug Related Killings: Revival of the Federal Death Penalty, 67 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 79, 86 & n.26 (1992); Little, History, supra note 4, at 349 n.5, 373-76.
11

See John P. Cunningham, Comment, Death in the Federal Courts: Expectations and Realities of the Federal
Death Penalty Act of 1994, 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 939, 950 (1998).

12

Charles C. Boettcher, Comment, Testing the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 29 Tex. Tech. L. Rev.
1043, 1054 (1998).
13

See John Brigham, Unusual Punishment: The Federal Death Penalty in the United States, 16 Wash. U. J.L.
& Pol’y 195, 210-11 (2004); Little, History, supra note 4, at 381-88; Little, Future, supra note 4, at 539.

14

Boettcher, supra note 12, at 1057.

15

See Little, History, supra note 4, at 388-91.

16

See Little, History, supra note 4, at 391 (quoting Charles Kenneth Eldred, Recent Developments, The New
Federal Death Penalties, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 293, 297 n.21 (1994)).

17

See Boettcher, supra note 12, at 1057; Brigham, supra note 13, at 211; Cunningham, supra note 11, at 952;
Cutler, supra note 4, at 1209-10 & n.150; Eldred, supra note 16, at 293 n.2; Kannar, supra note 7, at 328.
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[and] offenses committed exclusively on federal territory,”18 every crime covered by the Kingpin
Act and the FDPA is also punishable pursuant to the laws of the several States.19 Indeed, every
single one of the 40 current federal death row prisoners might have been tried, convicted, and
sentenced for murder in State court.20
B.

The Federal Death Penalty in States Without Capital Punishment
As of this writing, capital punishment is unauthorized by twelve States: Alaska, Hawaii,

Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin.21 Yet the federal death penalty applies nationwide, even in those States

18

Little, Future, supra note 4, at 542.

19

See Boettcher, supra note 12, at 1054-55, 1058-59; Cunningham, supra note 11, at 954-55; Eldred, supra
note 16, at 296-97; Little, History, supra note 4, at 388-91 & nn.232, 237, 238; Little, Future, supra note 4, at 541;
Sean M. Morton, Comment, Death Isn't Welcome Here: Evaluating the Federal Death Penalty in the Context of a
State Constitutional Objection to Capital Punishment, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1435, 1440 (2001); Brian Serr, Of Crime and
Punishment, Kingpins and Footsoldiers, Life and Death: The Drug War and the Federal Death Penalty Provision –
Problems of Interpretation and Constitutionality, 25 Ariz. St. L.J. 895, 906
- 18 (1993); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Drugs
and Death: Congress Authorizes the Death Penalty for Certain Drug-Related Murders, 18 J. Contemp. L. 47, 69
(1992).
20

See Little, Future, supra note 4, at 532-33 (“[O]f the twenty-six federal defendants that have been sentenced
to death since 1988 [as of 2000], all were convicted of criminal conduct duplicative of capital murder conduct as
defined by the states in which the murders occurred.”). See also Rory K. Little, Why a Federal Death Penalty
Moratorium?, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 791, 802-07 (2001). For an update to Little’s work, see
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=193 (last viewed Aug. 12, 2005). Despite the fact that
some of these crimes occurred on federal property, the defendants’ “conduct plainly violated state murder statutes,”
Little, Future, supra note 4, at 533 n.17, and “there is no theoretical reason that states could not be given authority to
prosecute crimes committed on federal property within their borders.” For a helpful chart demonstrating the state
crimes for which these federal prisoners could have been prosecuted, see id. at 543-44.
21

See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1201 (2005). Although Kansas has a death penalty statute, it was
invalidated in State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445 (Kan. 2004). However, the U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to hear
the case. See Kansas v. Marsh, 73 USLW 3539 (U.S. Kan. May 31, 2005) (NO. 04-1170). New York also has a
death penalty statute that recently was invalidated in People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004). The state did
not petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, see e-mail correspondence from Barbara Zolot,
Supervising Attorney, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York, N.Y., dated June 8, 2005 (on file with author),
and its time for doing so has expired. Prospects in New York for reinstatement of the death penalty appear dim. See
Patrick D. Healy, “Death Penalty Seems Unlikely to be Revived,” N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2005. Thus, the number of
non-death penalty jurisdictions may soon rise to thirteen or fourteen.
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that do not authorize capital punishment for any crime.22 Indeed, the FDPA expressly contemplates
this, for it provides that if the conviction takes place in a State that does not authorize capital
punishment, the court must designate another State where the sentence may be executed.23
Moreover, “although the new federal statutes do not demand national uniformity in administration of
the federal death penalty, such a legislative policy is strongly implied.” 24
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) also has expressed a goal of avoiding geographical
disparity in the imposition of the federal death penalty.25 To achieve this end, DOJ has centralized
federal death penalty prosecutions by instituting formal Capital Case Protocols. These Protocols
require approval of the Attorney General via a Death Penalty Evaluation form before the death
penalty is sought in any federal case.26 In addition, even in cases where the local U.S. Attorney
22

See Jordan, supra note 10, at 85 (observing that the 1988 Act “imposes the death penalty in states that have
not enacted legislation to execute their citizens, even for the most heinous crimes”); Little, History, supra note 4, at
472 (“Congress has written a federal death penalty statute which is applicable nationally and contains no express
suggestions or endorsement of regional disparities in its implementation.”); Morton, supra note 19, at 1436 (“[T]he
absence of a state capital punishment regime in a given state would not bar a federal capital prosecution in that state
. . . .”); Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce
Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 721, 731 (2002) (“[M]ost striking [in terms of federal/state
sentencing disparity] are the federal death penalty cases in states that do not authorize capital punishment.”); see
also Brigham, supra note 13, at 216 (“[N]o jurisdiction will be able to declare itself a death penalty free zone.’”)
(quoting Eric Goldscheider, “Fed’s Death Penalty Net Casts Ever Wider,” Boston Globe, June 11, 2000, at E1).

23

See Little, History, supra note 4, at 404; see also Brigham, supra note 13, at 225 n.133; Cunningham, supra
note 11, at 957; Cutler, supra note 4, at 1214; Jordan, supra note 10, at 91; Kannar, supra note 7, at 331; Morton,
supra note 19, at 1444.
24

Little, History, supra note 4, at 431-32. Little notes that that “one goal” of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 “was to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparities’ among similar cases and defendants across the
country.” Id. at 436 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)); see also id. at 472 (similar); id. at. 356 (asserting that
Congress “has stated a general sentencing policy that regional disparities’ should be avoided.”).

25

See Little, History, supra note 4, at 439 (“[I]t appears to be current DOJ policy that, as best as humanly
possible, the federal death penalty be administered uniformly across the nation.”); John Gleeson, Supervising
Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against
the Death Penalty, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1697, 1699 (2003) (stating that DOJ has attempted “to achieve national uniformity
in the imposition of the death penalty”).
26

See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual §§ 9-10.020, 9-10.040 (updated June 7, 2001)
(online at www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam) [hereinafter 2001 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual]; accord
Little, History, supra note 4, at 407; see also id. at 424 (“Only the Attorney General can make a final decision
regarding the death penalty.”).
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could, butdoes not, request permission from the Attorney General to seek the death penalty, she
must still complete such a form.27
Three significant changes instituted shortly after President George W. Bush took power
have made it more likely that the U.S. government would seek the death penalty at a higher rate than
previously in districts within States that do not authorize capital punishment. First, prior to that
time, “recommendation[s] . . . against seeking death in a death-eligible case [were] almost always
accepted . . . because U.S. Attorneys generally exercise great care in submitting their
recommendations and are presumed to know their local communities, jury pools, judges, and the
overall strengths and weaknesses of their particular case far better than Main Justice personnel.”28
By contrast, in more recent cases, the decision to seek the death penalty in several caseswas made
over the contrary recommendations of the local U.S. Attorneys.29
Second, prior to 2001, a local U.S. Attorney was required to submit a Death Penalty
Evaluation form when a “defendant [was] charge[d] . . . with an offense subject to the death
penalty.’”30 The DOJ, under the leadership of newly appointed Attorney General John Ashcroft,
amended the Protocols in June 2001, to require submission of the form whenever the local U.S.
Attorney has charged a defendant with “an offense that is punishable by death or conduct that could
be charged as an offense punishable by death.”31 The intent of the change is obvious. Under the
prior version of the Protocols, a local U.S. Attorney could evade DOJ review of the decision not to
27

See 2001 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 26, § 9-10.040; accord Little, History, supra note 4, at 408.

28

Little, History, supra note 4, at 422; see also Gleeson, supra note 25, at 1715 (“U.S. Attorneys know . . .
how the communities they serve and protect perceive crimes and evaluate punishments.”).
29

See Shelley Murphy, “Death Penalty Foes Rap Ashcroft,” Boston Globe, Sept. 30, 2003 (online at
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2003/09/20/death_penalty_foes_rap_ashcroft?mode=PF ).
30

Little, History, supra note 4, at 409-10 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 910.040 (updated Jan. 8, 1999)) [hereinafter 1999 United States Attorneys’ Manual]) (alteration in original).

31

2001 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 26, § 9-10.040 (emphasis added).
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seek the death penalty through the simple expedient of declining to charge the defendant with a
capital crime but instead charging him with a lesser offense. Thus could a U.S. Attorney in a State
with no death penalty adhere to local views on capital punishment and avoid acceding to the
otherwise mandatory DOJ review. Under the revised version of the Protocols, the only way for a
local U.S. Attorney to evade such review is by declining to obtain an indictment of the defendant at
all. Otherwise, the DOJ reviews every case in which a defendant’s alleged conduct subjects him to
the federal death penalty.
The final change implemented by the Bush administration is the most significant. The
Protocols have always “suggest[ed] that a federal indictment should be returned in a potential death
penalty case only when the Federal interest in the prosecution is more substantial than the interests
of the State or local authorities.’”32 This instruction suggests a presumption in favor of state rather
than federal prosecution.33 Prior to the revisions, however, “[t]he protocols expressly direct[ed] that
. . . penalty-driven decisions to file federal charges are inappropriate: the fact that the maximum
Federal penalty is death [where the relevant state’s maximum penalty is not] is insufficient, standing
alone, to show a more substantial interest in Federal prosecution.’”34 This admonition was removed
from the June 2001 version of the Protocols.35 Although the Protocols do not expressly state that the
absence of death as a possible punishment in State court is a sufficient reason in and of itself to bring
32
Little, History, supra note 4, at 413 (quoting 1999 United States Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 30, § 910.070); accord Morton, supra note 19, at 1441..
33

See Little, History, supra note 4, at 464-65 (“[T]he DOJ’s death penalty protocols seem to suggest a
preference for state prosecution in potential federal capital cases . . . .”); cf. O’Hear, supra note 22, at 733-34 n.73
(“The presumption in favor of federal prosecution is not so strong in capital cases.”).
34

Little, History, supra note 4, at 414 (quoting 1999 United States Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 30, § 910.070) (alteration in original); see also id. at 466 (“[T]he death penalty protocols make it clear that the fact that the
death sentence might be available if the case were charged federally, where the conduct occurred in a state that does
not authorize capital punishment, is not alone’ sufficient to establish a more substantial’ federal interest.”); accord
Morton, supra note 19, at 1442 & n.49; O’Hear, supra note 22, at 731 n.57.
35

See O’Hear, supra note 22, at 731 n.57; see also Murphy, supra note 29.
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a federal prosecution, the message to local U.S. Attorneys is unmistakable: it is now “ fair game’ to
pull a state case into federal court in a bid to win a death sentence.”36
As a result, five of the 40 current federal death row prisoners were tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death for conduct committed within States that do not authorize capital punishment.37
Marvin Gabrion was sentenced to death on March 16, 2002, for a 1997 murder in Manistee National
Forest, located in Michigan.38 Gary Sampson was convicted of murdering two men during a
carjacking in Massachusetts, and he was sentenced to death on January 29, 2004.39 On October 27,
2004, and June 21, 2005, respectively, federal juries returned verdicts sentencing Dustin Honken and
Angela Johnson to death for the murder of two girls in Iowa who were witnesses to the murder of
their mother.40 Most recently, a federal jury in Vermont on July 14, 2005, recommended a sentence
of death for Donald Fell, who murdered a woman following a carjacking in that State.41
Additionally, Alfonso Rodriguez Jr. has been charged with kidnapping a woman in North Dakota

36

Murphy, supra note 29 (quoting Donald K. Stern, former US attorney for the District of Massachusetts); see
also Brigham, supra note 13, at 220 (“[F]ederal capital statutes are sometimes turned to where the availability of the
death penalty under federal law presents an opportunity to seek harsher punishment where the states do not provide
a capital sanction.”).
37

Cf. Morton, supra note 19, at 1465 (presciently predicting in 2001 that “it seems almost inevitable . . . that a
[successful] federal capital prosecution will occur in a state that does not . . . provide for . . . the death penalty” );
O’Hear, supra note 22, at 731 n.57 (making similar prediction in 2002).
38

See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=193 (last viewed June 8, 2005).

39

See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=193 (last viewed June 8, 2005); supra test
accompanying notes 1 to 3.
40

See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=193 (last viewed Aug. 12, 2005).
Although Honken and Johnson have not been formally sentenced as of this writing, the judge is required by the
jury's verdict to impose the death sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3594;
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=193 (last viewed Aug. 12, 2005). It appears that, as of
this writing, post-trial motions are still pending in that case. See U.S. v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1052 (N.D.
Iowa 2005).
41

See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=193 (last viewed Aug. 12, 2005).
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and murdering her in Minnesota.42 His capital trial is scheduled to start March 6, 2006, in U.S.
District Court for the District of North Dakota.43 Each of these defendants could have been
prosecuted on state-law murder charges in Michigan,44 Massachusetts,45 Iowa,46 Vermont,47 or North
Dakota,48 respectively. However, none of these states authorizes the punishment of death for murder
or any other crime.49
Of course, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, provides that the “Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”50 Thus, it appears at first blush that the authorization by Congress of the death
penalty in federal cases trumps the policy decision of an individual State to eschew capital
punishment. But, of course, the U.S. Constitution also contains a later-enacted provision limiting the
42

See “Dru Sjodin Case: Rodriguez Trial Jury Pool Will Come From Southeastern North Dakota,” Grand
Fork Herald, Dec. 16, 2004 (online at http://www.grandforks.com/mld/grandforks/news/local/10427569.htm).
43

See id.

44

See Mich. Cons. Laws § 750.316(a) (“A person who commits . . . [m]urder perpetrated by means of poison,
lying in wait, or any other willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing . . . is guilty of first degree murder . . . .”).
Though Gabrion’s crime occurred on federal land, Michigan has retained concurrent criminal jurisdiction over
national forest lands in the State. See Mich. Cons. Laws § 3.401.
45

See Mass. Gen. Laws 265 § 1 (“Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, is murder in the first degree.”).

46

See Iowa Code Ann. § 707.2(1) (“A person commits murder in the first degree when the person . . .
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation kills another person.”).
47

See Vt. Stat. Ann. § 2301 (“Murder . . . committed in perpetrating . . . robbery . . . shall be murder in the
first degree.”).
48

See N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-16-01(1)(c) (“A person is guilty of murder . . . if the person . . . commits . . .
robbery [or] kidnapping . . . and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom,
the person or any other participant in the crime causes the death of any person.”).
49

See supra text accompanying note 21.

50

U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.
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federal government’s power to punish. Does the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual
punishments”51 have any impact on the ability of the federal government to impose the death penalty
within the boundaries of a State that chooses not to do so?52 It is to this question that this Article
now turns.

51

“[C]ruel and unusual punishments [shall not] be inflicted.” U.S. Const., amend VIII.

52

This question has not been addressed in any systematic fashion. Professor Rory K. Little has
acknowledged that “the federalism issues raised by applying a national death penalty law in states that do not accept
that penalty raise vital questions that go deep into our theories of government as well as criminal punishment.”
Little, Future, supra note 4, at 573-74. He allows that “[o]n an issue so sensitive, so irrevocable, and so morally
defined for many, perhaps recognition of state preferences is not unreasonable.” Id. at 566. Yet Little indicates his
belief that any exemptions for whole states from the federal death penalty “runs counter to the overwhelming
number of federal criminal sentencing provisions” that stress national uniformity and seek to avoid geographic
disparities. Id. at 565. Ultimately, Little leaves the issue for another day. See id. at 566.
A provision of the Innocence Protection Act of 2000 (“IPA”), introduced in the U.S. Senate, see S. 2073,
106th Cong., § 401 (2000), would have generally prohibited the federal government from “seek[ing] the death
penalty in any case initially brought before a district court of the United States that sits in a State that does not
prescribe, authorize, or permit the imposition of such penalty for the alleged conduct.” See Brigham, supra note 13,
at 219; Little, Future, supra note 4, at 564. However, the Senate sponsors’ belief that they were merely exercising
legislative grace, rather than acting pursuant to constitutional mandate, is demonstrated by the fact that the
exemption could have been overridden upon appropriate certification by the Attorney General. See S. 2073, 106th
Cong., § 401 (2000); Little, Future, supra note 4, at 564-65. In any event, when the IPA became law in 2004, this
provision was not included. See Ronald Weich, The Innocence Protection Act of 2004: A Small Step Forward and
a Framework for Larger Reforms, 29 Champion 28, 29 (2005).
Professor John Brigham, quoting an e-mail communication from former Oregon Supreme Court Justice
Hans Linde, has suggested that “[t]he death penalty no longer is unusual in Texas or Florida, but is highly unusual,
and arguably regarded as unacceptably cruel, among the people of Massachusetts.” Brigham, supra note 13, at 214
n.90. Brigham has endorsed Linde’s suggestion of “a state-based, relativist interpretation to [sic] the Eighth
Amendment’s ban against “cruel and unusual” punishments.’” Id. (emphasis omitted). However, he has not
supported this position with any textual, historical, or structural analysis of the Eighth Amendment.
Finally, student commentator Sean Morton has argued that the notion of “cruel and unusual punishments’
under the Eighth Amendment should be defined according to local values expressed by individual states through
fundamental state law.” Morton, supra note 19, at 1437-38 (footnote omitted). However, he apparently would limit
application of this principle in two ways. First, it would apply only to those States whose constitutions forbid the
death penalty. See id. at 1463 (“[A] serious difficulty arises when the federal government attempts to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction within a State that affirmatively prohibits the death penalty via that state’s constitution.”)
(emphasis added). Second, it would apply only to States that reject “the death penalty as an impermissible cruel and
unusual punishment,” see id at 1437, rather than merely undesirable or ineffective. Additionally, like Brigham,
Morton does not engage in any sustained textual, historical, or structural analysis of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.
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II. THEORIES OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
What is known as the Supreme Court’s “Eighth Amendment” jurisprudence is really an
amalgam of jurisprudence of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, since most of the decisional
law has come from the States.53 To understand the jurisprudence in this area, we must first take a
brief look at the Eighth Amendment’s text and its history.
A.

A Word (or Two) About the Text
Our starting point, of course, is the text of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. As

Justice Scalia has noted, for a punishment to violate the Clause, it must be both “cruel and
unusual.”54 After all, at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, “five State Constitutions
prohibited cruel or unusual punishments,’ and two prohibited cruel’ punishments.”55 Had the
framers and ratifiers of the Eighth Amendment meant it to prohibit anything less than punishments
that were both cruel and unusual, they knew how to do so. Yet cruelty is not a difficult threshold to
meet. At the time the Clause’s direct ancestor, the English Bill of Rights,56 was written, “the word
cruel’ . . . simply meant severe or hard.”57 Thus, a sentence of death or of a lengthy term of
imprisonment at hard labor might be cruel but, as Tom Jones might say, it’s not unusual.58
53

See George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights
and Criminal Procedure, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 145, 162 (2001) (“[M]ost of what we know or think we know about the
Bill of Rights guarantees has been produced by cases in which the Court is interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).

54

See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991) (plurality) (“[A] disproportionate punishment can
perhaps always be considered cruel,’ but it will not always be (as the text also requires) unusual.’”).
55

Id. at 966 (plurality) (emphasis added). See also id. at 984-85 (distinguishing State v. Becker, 51 N.W.
1018, 1022 (S.D. 1892), on ground that state constitutional provision there prohibited punishments “that were
merely cruel’”). But see John L. Bowers, Jr., & J.L. Boren, Jr., The Constitutional Prohibition Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment – Its Present Significance, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 680, 681 n.1 (1951) (“Apparently, no significance
attaches to these variations; cruel is the key word in all.”).
56

See infra text accompanying notes 62 to 63.

57

Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L.
Rev. 839, 860 (1969).
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But it is not enough that a punishment be both unusual and severe (cruel). For example,
granted that death is a severe, and therefore cruel, punishment, a novel method of execution, never
before attempted, and therefore unusual, might on that account be considered both “cruel” and
“unusual.” However, the Supreme Court rejected this very argument, albeit in dicta, in In re
Kemmler, writing that the electric chair, though unusual in 1890 because novel, did not render death
by electrocution cruel and unusual, because the method of execution was adopted to make the
process more, not less, humane.59 Rather, “ [u]nusual’ is probably best thought of as adverbially
modifying cruel.’” 60 That is, the Clause forbids extreme distinctness of punishment in the direction
of greater, but not lesser, cruelty.61
But the text of the Amendment can take us only thus far. History must be our next guide.
B.

Origins of the Eighth Amendment
It is widely accepted that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause derives directly from

section 9 of the 1776Virginia Declaration of Rights, which in turn was derived from the 1689
English Bill of Rights.62 Indeed, except for the fact that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

58

See Tom Jones, “It’s Not Unusual,” on Along Came Jones (Decca Records 1965).

59

136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); see Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Substantive
Criminal Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 635, 637 (1966) (“[T]he novelty of a punishment – the mere fact that it is unusual,’
without any excessive cruelty – does not suffice to prohibit it constitutionally.”).
60

Note, supra note 59, at 638 n.16.

61

See Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 119, 149
(2004) (defining “cruel and unusual” as “depart[ure] from precedent without morally sufficient reason in the
direction of greater severity”).

62

See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991) (plurality); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 n.10
(1983); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977); see also Chris Baniszewski, Comment, Supreme Court
Review of Excessive Prison Sentences: The Eighth Amendment’s Proportionality Requirement, 25 Ariz. St. L.J. 930
(1993); Granucci, supra note 57, at 852-53; William Hughes Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The
Proportionality Rule, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 639, 640 (1979); Note, supra note 59, at 636; Malcolm E. Wheeler,
Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 838, 839
(1972).
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contains the mandatory “shall” rather than the precatory “ought,” it is a verbatim replica of the same
clause in the English Bill.63 Thus, it is universally recognized that the history surrounding the
enactment of the English Bill is relevant to a complete understanding of our own Eighth
Amendment.64
It is generally believed that the “cruel and unusual punishments” provision of the English
Bill was prompted by one or both of two episodes in English history, both involving Lord Chief
Justice Jeffreys who served on the King’s Bench during the reign of James II, the last of the Stuart
kings.65 First, following an unsuccessful rebellion by the Duke of Monmouth in 1685, “a special
commission led by Jeffreys tried, convicted, and executed hundreds of suspected insurgents.”66 The
commission practiced the traditional method of execution for traitors: drawing the condemned man
to the gallows on a cart; hanging by the neck; cutting down the prisoner before death ensues;
disemboweling the prisoner while still alive and burning his entrails; beheading; and quartering the

63

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966 (plurality); Bowers & Boren, supra note 55, at 682; Neil H. Cogan, The
Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins 617 (1997); Granucci, supra note 57, at 853;
Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of William
Rummel, 71 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 378, 378 (1980); Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, Comment, the
Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States
Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 Buff. L. Rev. 783, 788 n.11 (1974).
64

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967 (plurality).

65

See id.; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977); Note, What is Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 24
Harv. L. Rev. 54, 55 (1910).
66

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968 (plurality); see Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 931; Granucci, supra note 57, at
853; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 378.
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body.67 Female traitors were burned at the stake.68 The proceedings came to be known as the
“Bloody Assizes.”69
The second episode involved Titus Oates, a Protestant cleric. In 1679, Oates testified
against a number of “prominent Catholics for allegedly organizing a Popish Plot’ to overthrow King
Charles II.”70 The defendants were convicted and executed.71 It was later discovered that Oates was
an inveterate liar who had perjured himself, leading to the execution of at least fifteen innocent
men.72 Oates was tried for perjury and convicted in 1685.73 At sentencing, Jeffreys deemed it
unfortunate that the death penalty could no longer be imposed for perjury,74 but asserted that “crimes
of this nature are left to be punished according to the discretion of the court, so far as that the
judgment extend not to life or member.”75 The court sentenced Oates to pay a fine of 2,000 marks,
to be defrocked, to be pilloried four times annually, to be whipped “ from Aldgate to Newgate’” on

67

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 931; Granucci, supra note 57, at
854; Mulligan, supra note 62, at 640; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 378.
68

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968 (plurality); Granucci, supra note 57, at 853.

69

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 931; Granucci, supra note 57, at
853; Mulligan, supra note 62, at 640; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 378.

70

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969 (plurality); see Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 932; Claus, supra note 61, at 136;
Granucci, supra note 57, at 856-57; Mulligan, supra note 62, at 640-41; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 379.

71

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 932; Claus, supra note 61, at 136;
Granucci, supra note 57, at 857; Mulligan, supra note 62, at 641.
72

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 932; Claus, supra note 61, at 136;
Granucci, supra note 57, at 857; Mulligan, supra note 62, at 641; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 379.
73

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 932; Granucci, supra note 57, at
857; Mulligan, supra note 62, at 640-41.
74

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 933; Claus, supra note 61, at 137;
Granucci, supra note 57, at 857-58.
75

Claus, supra note 61, at 137.
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May 20, to be whipped “ from Newgate to Tyburn’” on May 22, and to life imprisonment.76
Apparently, Jeffreys believed this to be the equivalent of a death sentence, for he did not expect
Oates to survive the whipping.77
He was wrong. After the enactment of the English Bill of Rights in 1689, Oates asked the
Parliament to set aside his sentence as contrary to the provisions of the Bill.78 Although the Lords
refused to disturb the sentence,79 a minority dissented and issued a statement opining that Oates’
punishment was contrary to the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause of the Bill.80 Oates then
persuaded the House of Commons to pass a bill annulling the sentence, but the Commons was
unsuccessful in getting the Lords to change their position.81 However, the Commons issued a report
echoing the sentiments of the dissenting Lords, explaining why the Oates punishment was “cruel and
unusual” in violation of the English Bill.82
Of course, the most important evidence regarding the term “cruel and unusual
punishment” must come from those who framed and ratified the Eighth Amendment.83
Unfortunately, the history surrounding the adoption of the Amendment is sparse. It appears that
Congressional debate on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was limited to one relatively
76

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970 (plurality); see Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 933; Claus, supra note 61, at 137;
Granucci, supra note 57, at 858; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 379.

77

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970 (plurality).

78

See id.; Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 933; Claus, supra note 61, at 139; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 379.

79

See Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 933; Claus, supra note 61, at 140.

80

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 971 (plurality); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 933-34; Claus, supra note 61, at
140-41; Granucci, supra note 57, at 858; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 379.

81

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 971 (plurality); Claus, supra note 61, at 139; Schwartz, supra note 63, at 379.

82

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 972 (plurality); Claus, supra note 61, at 142-43 n.107.

83

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 975 (plurality) (“[T]he ultimate question is not what cruell and unusuall
punishments” meant in the Declaration of Rights, but what its meaning was to the Americans who adopted the
Eighth Amendment.”).
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unenlightening exchange.84 To find any helpful discussion of the concept of cruel and unusual
punishments, one must go back to two State ratifying conventions held to debate the ratification of
the Constitution. In Massachusetts, delegate Abraham Holmes complained:
Congress [would be] possessed of powers enabling them to institute judicatories
little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain, which has long been the
disgrace of Christendom: I mean that diabolical institution, the Inquisition:
What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy circumstances
is . . . that Congress [is] nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and
unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no
constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most
mild instruments of their discipline.85
In Virginia, contrasting the Constitution with the State’s own Bill of Rights, delegate
George Mason noted that “torture was included in the prohibition” of the “clause of the [Virginia]
bill of rights provid[ing] that no cruel or unusual punishments shall be inflicted.”86 The next day,
delegate Patrick Henry expressed his trust in the Nation’s officials in defining crimes but not in
prescribing the punishments for them:
Congress, from their general powers, may fully go into the business of human
legislation. They may legislate, in criminal cases, from treason to the lowest
offence – petty larceny. They may define crimes and prescribe punishments. In
the definition of crimes, I trust they will be directed by what wise representatives
ought to be governed by. But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought
to be left, nor dependence put on the virtues of representatives. . . .
In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will lose the
restriction of not . . . inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are
prohibited by your declaration of rights. What has distinguished our ancestors? –
That they would not admit of tortures or cruel and barbarous punishment. But
84

See Cogan, supra note 63, at 618; see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666 (1977); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 369 (1910); Claus, supra note 61, at 128; Granucci, supra note 57, at 842; Youngjae Lee, The
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 Va. L. Rev. 677, 705 (2005).
85

2 J. Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 111
(2d ed. 1881); see also Claus, supra note 61, at 130; Granucci, supra note 57, at 841.

86

3 J. Elliot, supra note 85, at 451-52; see also Claus, supra note 61, at 131; Granucci, supra note 57, at 841-

42.
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Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the
common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany –
of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as
well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell
you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government, that
they must have a criminal equity, and extort confessions by torture, in order to
punish with still more relentless severity.87
Running through these American and British pre-enactment statements are several themes
that have re-appeared in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
C.

Cruel and Unusual Punishments Under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
A number of substantive88 principles can be drawn from the Eighth Amendment case law.

First, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits judges from imposing punishments that
are not authorized by statute. Second, it prohibits the legislature from authorizing certain modes of
punishment. Third, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of punishments that are grossly
disproportionate to the crime committed. And, finally, the Eighth Amendment categorically bars the
death penalty for certain classes of offenses and offenders.89

87

3 J. Elliot, supra note 85, at 447-48) ; see also Claus, supra note 61, at 131; Granucci, supra note 57, at 841

n.10.
88

I say “substantive” to distinguish these principles from the specialized procedural guidelines the Court has
established in death penalty cases beginning with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976), and Gregg’s companion cases. See Lee, supra note 84, at 725 (distinguishing Court’s
“substantive” from “procedural” death penalty jurisprudence). In the simplest of terms, those specialized procedures
are designed to further the twin (and some say irreconcilable) goals of (1) eliminating arbitrariness in capital
sentencing and (2) ensuring individualized treatment of the capital defendant. See Linda E. Carter & Ellen
Kreitzberg, Understanding Capital Punishment Law § 13.06, at 178-81 (2004). Arguably, these two lines of cases,
given that they address procedural requirements, are not Eighth Amendment cases at all but are pure “due process”
cases that prescribe the process that is due when life – the predominant value in the “life, liberty, or property”
hierarchy – is on the line. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super
Due Process for Death, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1143 (1980).
89

The Court has also held that “the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause imposes substantive limits on
what can be made criminal and punished as such.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977). The Court has
applied this limitation in only a single case, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667(1962), in which the Court
held that it violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment,
for California to make narcotics addiction a criminal offense. The Court made clear that it was not the possible
sentence – 90 days in jail – that was unconstitutional but the fact that the State had made such a status criminal at all:
“Even one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the crime’ of having a common cold.” Id.
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1.

Prohibitions on Severe Punishment Not Authorized by Law

The core, uncontroversial protection provided by the Eighth Amendment is that severe
punishments that are unauthorized by law are forbidden. Referring to Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys’
role in both the Bloody Assizes and the Titus Oates affair, Justice Scalia wrote for a plurality in
Harmelin v. Michigan that “Jeffreys was widely accused of inventing’ special penalties for the
King’s enemies . . . that were not authorized by common-law precedent or by statute.”90 Justice
Scalia also relied on many of the statements from the House of Commons report and the dissenters
in the House of Lords regarding the Titus Oates case to shore up this conclusion. The Commons
report had noted, for example, that “there [was] no express Law to warrant” life imprisonment for
Oates, and that Jeffreys and his colleagues had made a “Pretence to a discretionary Power” that did
not exist in the law.91 For their part, the dissenting Lords had noted that for King’s Bench to defrock

Accord id. at 676 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Cruel and unusual punishment results not from confinement, but from
convicting the addict of a crime.”).
However, as Herbert Packer recognized shortly after Robinson was decided – and surprisingly few have
acknowledged since – Robinson is not really an Eighth Amendment decision at all but one that sounds purely in due
process:
Robinson v. California may have established in the eighth amendment a basis for invalidating
legislation that is thought inappropriately to invoke the criminal sanction, despite an entire lack
of precedent for the idea that a punishment may be deemed cruel not because of its mode or
even its proportion but because the conduct for which it is imposed should not be subjected to
the criminal sanction.
Herbert L. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1071 (1964) (footnote omitted).
See also Mulligan, supra note 62, at 644 (“[W]hether a certain act should be a crime and whether the punishment
should fit the crime are entirely separate inquiries.”); Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 63, at 802 (“It is
questionable whether Robinson really presented an eighth amendment issue. [T]he application of the eighth
amendment to the nature of the conduct made criminal, instead of the method or kind of punishment, represented a
unique use of the amendment’s protections.”).
90

501 U.S. 957, 968 (1991) (plurality).

91

Id. at 973 (plurality).
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Oates was “wholly out of their Power, belonging to the Ecclesiastical Courts only,” and that the
sentence was “contrary to Law and ancient Practice.”92
Justice Scalia deduced from this that the “requirement that punishment not be unusuall’ . .
. was primarily a requirement that judges pronouncing sentence remain within the bounds of
common-law tradition.” 93 However, “[d]epartures from the common law were lawful . . . if
authorized by statute.” 94 In short, he concluded, “a punishment is cruel and unusual’ if it is illegal
because not sanctioned by common law or statute.”95
Justice Scalia recognized, however, that the Clause could not be wrenched from its British
roots and simply re-planted in American soil. Merely limiting judges to the imposition of
punishments authorized by statute or common law made sense in Great Britain, with its notion of
legislative supremacy. The Eighth Amendment, however, was meant also, even primarily, as a
check upon the Legislature.96 Therefore, the Clause must mean something more.

92

Id.

93

Id. at 974 (plurality); accord Claus, supra note 61, at 121 (“In adopting the 1689 Bill of Rights, the English
Parliament sought to condemn punishments that were illegal because they were contrary to the common law . . . in
the direction of greater severity.”).
94

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 974 (plurality).

95

Id. at 984 n.10 (plurality); see also Claus, supra note 61, at 136 (asserting that the “core concern” of those
who drafted the English cruel and unusual punishments clause “was illegality, that is, violation of the common law
or existing statutes”); Granucci, supra note 57, at 859 (“In the context of Oates’ case, cruel and unusual’ seems to
have meant a severe punishment unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction of the court to impose.”);
Wheeler, supra note 62, at 855 (“[O]ne of the two recognized purposes of the original language of [the English Bill]
was to prevent the judiciary from exceeding its authority in punishing criminals.”).
96

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 975-76 (plurality); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 665 (1977)
(“Americans . . . feared the imposition of torture and other cruel punishments not only by judges acting beyond their
lawful authority, but also by legislatures engaged in making the laws by which judicial authority would be
measured. Indeed, the principal concern of the American Framers appears to have been with the legislative
definition of crimes and punishments.”); Claus, supra note 61, at 146 (“The American founders adopted the
punishments’ prohibition of the English Bill of Rights as a limitation on the power of the new federal government,
without specifying to which branch or branches of that government the limitations applied.”); Mulligan, supra note
62, at 639 (“The . . . restriction binds both the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government . . . .”).
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2.

Prohibitions on Unduly Severe Modes of Punishment

The second uncontroversial proposition in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the imposition ofcertain m odes of punishment.
Justice Scalia set forth this interpretation in his plurality opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan.97 Since,
in the context of American constitutionalism, “unusual” could not mean only unauthorized by
positive law, it must be given its other typical meaning: “ [s]uch as [does not] occu[r] in ordinary
practice.’”98 Accordingly, “the Clause disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or
modes’ of punishment – specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or
customarily employed.”99
This view is supported by the statements of those who voiced support for the addition of a
cruel and unusual punishments clause to the Constitution.100 George Mason observed that the
Virginia version of the Clause prohibited “torture.”101 Abraham Holmes feared that without such a
clause, Congress could introduce the “rack[] and [the] gibbet[].”102 And Patrick Henry warned that

97

501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality).

98

Id. at 976 (plurality) (quoting Webster’s American Dictionary (1828)) (alterations in original).

99

Id.; accord Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 85, 100 n.32 (1958) (plurality) (“If the word unusual’ is to have any
meaning apart from the word cruel’ . . . the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different
from that which is generally done.”); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (“[T]he Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause . . . limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes . .
. .”); Claus, supra note 61, at 123 (arguing that the Clause “condemn[s] punishments unknown to the common law
for the offense of conviction”); Lee, supra note 84, at 705 (“[T]here has been no disagreement on the proposition
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits [certain modes of punishment].”); Note, supra note 59, at 637 (“[T]he word
unusual’ . . . at least normally suggests that the provision is not intended to prohibit punishments that have been
commonly authorized or imposed.”).
100

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979-80 (plurality); Schwartz, supra note 63, at 382 (“[W]hat little evidence there
is clearly centers around a concern to prevent the national government from initiating barbarous methods of
punishment.”).
101

See supra text accompanying note 86.

102

See supra text accompanying note 85;
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without an express prohibition, Congress could establish “tortures or cruel and barbarous
punishment” such as that practiced by “the civil law” regimes in “France, Spain, and Germany.”103
This interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has manifested itself in
two ways. First, the Clause “forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of [a] death
sentence.”104 Thus, the Court has continually upheld the death penalty against the charge that it is
cruel and unusual, and has noted that “something more than the mere extinguishment of life,” such
as “torture or a lingering death,” must be present to render execution cruel and unusual.105 Though
the Court has not had occasion to rule that various methods of execution violate the Clause, it has
written in dicta that the traditional English punishment for treason106 is forbidden,107 as are “burning
at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, [and] the like.”108

103

See supra text accompanying note 87. Granucci, supra note 57, at 860 -65, argues that this view by Henry,
Holmes, and Mason was based on the erroneous belief that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the English
Bill also prohibited certain modes of punishment. Granucci’s argument that the English Bill did not proscribe
particular modes of punishment is persuasive. First, the gruesome methods of execution of female and male traitors
utilized by the Bloody Assizes continued in use until 1790 and 1814, respectively, more than a century after the Bill
was enacted. See id. at 855-56. In addition, each of the methods of punishment used against Titus Oates also was
continued in use for some times afterward – whipping until 1948. See id. at 859. It is also noteworthy that neither
the report of the House of Commons nor the statement of the dissenters in the House of Lords intimates that Oates’
punishment was illegal because of the methods used. But see Note, supra note 59, at 637 (asserting that “it was the
unusual cruelty in the method of punishment that was condemned” by the English Bill). Nonetheless, it seems
immaterial whether the framers’ intended use of the words “cruel and unusual” in the Eighth Amendment
conformed to a correct or an erroneous interpretation of the same words in another document; all that matters is the
meaning they intended. See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 380 (“[S]ince Granucci admits that the American framers
originally intended to prohibit cruel methods of punishment, one must question the relevance of his two proposed
English meanings, even assuming they are correct.”).
104

Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (plurality)
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In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (dicta).
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See supra text accompanying note 67.
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See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (dicta) (“[P]unishments of torture . . . and all others in the
same line of unnecessary cruelty [as were practiced by the Stuart Kings] are forbidden by [the Eighth]
[A]mendment.”).
108

Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446 (dicta); accord Bowers & Boren, supra note 55, at 685 (observing that the Clause
prohibits “torturous and barbarous punishments [such] as drawing and quartering, disemboweling, stretching on the
rack, breaking on the wheel, and burning alive”).
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Second, certain types of non-capital punishments are forbidden. For example, in Weems
v. United States, the defendant was convicted of making a false entry in a public document with
intent to defraud the government.109 He was sentenced to: (1) 15 years of cadena temporal, a form
of punishment encompassing “hard and painful labor” while “carry[ing] a chain at the ankle,
hanging from the wrist”; (2) civil interdiction, depriving him “of the rights of parental authority,
guardianship of person or property, participation in the family council, marital authority, [and] the
right to dispose of his own property by acts inter vivos”; (3) “perpetual absolute disqualification”
from voting or holding public office; and (4) lifetime surveillance by the authorities, including the
inability to move his domicile without permission and the requirement that he make himself and his
home available for inspection.110 The Court held this sentence to violate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.111
Weems is extraordinarily significant, for at least two reasons. First, the Court rejected the
idea that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was static, instead adopting a dynamic view of
the Clause: “[G]eneral language should not . . . be necessarily confined to the form that evil had
theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore, a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
it birth.”112 Second, the Weems Court introduced the notion of “intra-jurisdictional analysis,” i.e., a
comparison of the punishment for the crime in question with punishments for other crimes within the
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217 U.S. 349, 357 (1910).
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Id. at 363-65.
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See id. at 377.
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Id. at 373; see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s
proscriptions are not limited to those practices condemned by the common law in 1789.”); Mulligan, supra note 62,
at 644 (noting that Weems stands for the proposition “that the eighth amendment prohibition is evolutionary in
nature”).
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same jurisdiction.113 In Weems, the Court concluded that the punishment was too severe because,
first, more serious crimes were punished just as severely,114 and, second, comparable crimes were
treated less severely.115
Likewise, in Trop v. Dulles, a plurality of the Court determined that loss of citizenship for
a native-born citizen was cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of wartime desertion.116 Trop
reaffirmed both significant aspects of the Weems methodology. First, the Court reiterated that the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment was not frozen in time in 1791, but that “[t]he Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”117 Second, the Court performed a type of comparative analysis, this one inter-jurisdictional
in nature, noting that “[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness
is not to be imposed as punishment for a crime,” and that “only . . . the Philippines and Turkey[]
impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion.”118
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See Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 63, at 799.
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Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81 (noting that punishment was same for “forgery of or counterfeiting the
obligations or securities of the United States[,] a crime which may cause the loss of many thousands of dollars”); see
also id. at 380 (noting that several “degrees of homicide, . . . misprision of treason, inciting rebellion, conspiracy to
destroy the government by force, recruiting soldiers in the United States to fight against the Unites States, forgery of
letters patent, forgery of bonds and other instruments for the purpose of defrauding the United States, robbery, [and]
larceny” were each punished less severely).
115

See id. (noting that embezzlement, which was “similar[] to the offense for which Weems was convicted,”
was punishable only by two years imprisonment, with none of the “accessories” of the cadena temporal).
116

356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality). Justice Brennan concurred on the ground that denationalization for
wartime desertion was “beyond the power of Congress” because there was no rational relation between Congress’
power to wage war and a blanket rule stripping the citizenship of any and all wartime deserters. See id. at 113-14
(Brennan, J., concurring). Rather, the motive seemed to him to be “naked vengeance,” an improper legislative
purpose. See id. at 112 (Brennan, J., concurring).
117

Id. at 101 (plurality).

118

Id. at 102-03 (plurality).
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3.

Prohibitions on Disproportionate Punishment

The Court has also recognized another, more controversial proposition: that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits punishments that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime. The currently
operative exposition of this principle appears in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Harmelin v.
Michigan.119 The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, a court must ask whether “a threshold
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality.”120 If such an inference is raised, then the court undertakes “intrajurisdictional
and interjurisdictional analyses,” i.e., “a comparative analysis between [the] sentence [at issue] and
sentences imposed for other crimes in [the same jurisdiction] and sentences imposed for the same
crime in other jurisdictions.”121 These last two steps purport to “circumscribe federal judicial
subjectivity by relying on objective data from the state legislatures.”122
For example, in Solem v. Helm, the defendant was sentenced to the mandatory prison term
of life without parole for attempting to use a $100 check drawn on a non-existent account, after
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501 U.S. 957, 1001-05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Because
is separate opinion has been treated
Justice Kennedy concurred in the result on the narrowest grounds in Harmelin, h
as controlling. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-24 (2003) (plurality); Lee, supra note 84, at 693 (noting
that Justice Kennedy’s “opinion . . . eventually came to assume the status of law”).
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Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (plurality); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983); Lee, supra note 84, at 693-94.

121
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30 (plurality); Solem, 463 U.S. at 291; O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting) (noting that defendant received heavier prison term for selling liquor than he could have received for
“burglary or highway robbery”); Lee, supra note 84, at 693-94, 731. Cf. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 449 (1890)
(opining that Equal Protection Clause “requires that no different or higher punishment shall be imposed upon one
than is imposed upon all for like offenses”). When the Court initially established this standard in Solem, 463 U.S. at
292, it set forth these three factors as a non-exhaustive list of “objective criteria” for courts to consider. Justice
Kennedy altered this standard in Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment), by declaring that “intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case
in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality.”
122

Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth Amendment Challenges to the Length of a Criminal
Sentence: Following the Supreme Court “From Precedent to Precedent,” 27 Ariz. L. Rev. 25, 56 (1985).
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having previously been convictedof six non -violent felonies.123 The Court determined that Helm’s
punishment, at first glance, seemed disproportionate to his crime.124 The Court then performed an
intrajurisdictional analysis and found both that “Helm ha[d] been treated in the same manner as, or
more severely than, criminals who have committed far more serious crimes,” and that it appeared
that Helm was the only individual South Dakota had punished as severely for comparable crimes.125
Finally, the Court found “thatHelm was treated more seve rely than he would have been in any other
State”: only Nevada provided for a comparable sentence for Helm’s crime, but even there, such a
sentence was merely authorized, not mandated, and it appeared that no one similar to Helm in
material respects had ever received such a sentence.126 The Court concluded that Helm’s sentence
was constitutionally disproportionate to his crime.127
The notion that the Eighth Amendment contains a proscription against disproportionate
punishments has engendered much controversy, both on and off the Court. Aside from textual and
historical arguments,128 detractors of this theory have substantial pragmatic grounds to dispute it.
They argue that the standards established by the Court to determine whether a punishment is
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463 U.S. 277, 279-80 (1983).
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See id. at 296-97.
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Id. at 299.
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Id. at 299-300.
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See id. at 303.
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See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 977 (1991) (plurality) (“[T]o use the phrase cruel and
unusual punishments’ to describe a requirement of proportionality would have been an exceedingly vague and
oblique way of saying what Americans were well accustomed to saying more directly.”); id. at 978 n.9 (plurality)
(“If cruel and unusual punishments’ included disproportionate punishments, the separate prohibition of
disproportionate fines (which are certainly punishments) would have been entirely superfluous.”); id. at 979
(plurality) (pointing out that all of the statements made surrounding adoption of Eighth Amendment discuss only
forbidden modes of punishment and none indicates an intention to proscribe disproportionate punishments); see also
Schwartz, supra note 63, at 378-82 (same). Because the rule espoused by this Article ultimately does not depend on
an Eighth Amendment disproportionality principle, a more complete analysis of these textual and historical
arguments is beyond the Article’s scope.
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disproportionate to the offense “seem so inadequate that the proportionality principle becomes an
invitation to imposition of subjective values.”129 Regarding the threshold issue, the gravity of the
crime, there simply is no objective way to measure “gravity.”130 It is true that some general
objective principles regarding the relative gravity of offenses can be formulated.131 For example,
the magnitude of different degrees of the exact same type of harm can be reliably measured;
intentional conduct is universally recognized as more serious than negligent conduct; lesser
included offenses are generally less serious than the greater offense; and “attempts are less serious
than completed crimes.”132 However, beyond these few guideposts, judges are largely at sea in
evaluating the relative gravity of crimes. Is intentionally selling cocaine worse than intentionally
embezzling a million dollars? And how should we treat a lesser mental state attendant toa greater
harm as compared with the reverse? That is, is intentionally cutting off another person’s pinky toe
worse than recklessly blinding her or negligently killing her? Moreover, the state might emphasize
deterrence, which depends not just on the severity of the punishment but also, among other things,
on its certainty.133 Depending on the particular crimes at issue, the perpetrator of the intuitively
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Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986 (plurality); see also Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 958-59 (“[T]he Helm test
gives judges too much discretion to impose their subjective values into sentencing.”).
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See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 987-88 (plurality); Baker & Baldwin, supra note 122, at 69 (“Ascertaining the
gravity of the offense is very problematical.”); Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 959 (“[A] threshold comparison’ of
the crime with the punishment . . . gives judges too much discretion in determining the gravity of the offense and
harshness of the penalty.”); Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages,
and Criminal Punishment, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 880, 888 (2004); (“Surely the seriousness of an offense is not a
universal, timeless fact.”); Mulligan, supra note 62, at 646 (“The first prong of the test requires the court to make a
judgment as to the seriousness of the crime charged and this of course invites the substitution of the subjective views
of the judge for those of the legislature.”).
131

See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 304 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[I]n this case, we can
identify and apply objective criteria that reflect constitutional standards of punishment and minimize the risk of
judicial subjectivity.”).
132

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293 (1983).
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See Harmelin, 501 U.S. 989 (plurality) (“[D]eterrent effect depends not only upon the amount of the
penalty but upon its certainty.”); Lee, supra note 84, at 738 (“[T]he less certain the punishment is, the more severe it
needs to be to sufficiently deter potential criminals.”).
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“lesser” crime might be so likely to escape capture that those who are brought to justice must be
dealt with more severely than those who commit the intuitively “greater” crime in order for the
punishment to have the desired deterrent effect,134 even assuming we can objectively differentiate
the lesser from the greater in the first place. Intra-jurisdictional analysis, comparison of
punishments for different crimes within the same jurisdiction, suffers from the same problem: “One
cannot compare the sentences imposed by the jurisdiction for similarly grave’ offenses if there is
no objective standard of gravity.”135
At the same time, difficulties in applying a proportionality principle cannot justify the
courts’ failure to enforce such a principle, assuming its existence is a justifiable conclusion from text
and history.136 Yet those who insist that the Eighth Amendment does contain a proportionality
principle find it difficult if not impossible to articulate a truly objective methodology for translating
that principle into law.137 The choice, then, seems to be between the courts’ abdication of their
responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amendment or their imposition of their own subjective views.138
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See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989 (plurality) (“[C]rimes that are less grave but significantly more difficult to
detect may warrant substantially higher penalties.”); Karlan, supra note 130, at 895 (similar); Wheeler, supra note
62, at 851-52 (“Some crimes cause little mischief but are more difficult to detect than more mischievous ones. . . . It
could therefore be argued that a severe penalty must be imposed for those few who are caught doing the proscribed
act . . . .”).
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Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988 (plurality); see also Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282 n.27 (“Other crimes . . . implicate
other societal interests, making any such comparison inherently speculative.”); Mulligan, supra note 62, at 647
(“The problem of determining the gravity of a particular crime is difficult enough without having to make judgments
about other crimes.”).
136

See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 383 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[A] general principle of deference
surely cannot justify the complete abdication of our responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amendment.”); Lee, supra
note 84, at 745 (“[T]he truism that legislatures get to decide amounts of punishment is no reason for the Court to
evade its responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amendment.”).
137

See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 122, at 59 (“The . . . demand for complete objectivity cannot be
satisfied.”).
138

See Bruce W. Gilchrist, Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119,
1136 (1979); see also Baniszewski, supra note 62, at 951 (“[T]he Court has not been able to develop an objective
approach or to strike a proper balance between the courts’ power of review and the legislatures’ initial power to
determine prison sentences.”).
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Although using only the inter-jurisdictional analysis is one potentialsolution, 139 that analysis has
pitfalls of its own, as will be demonstrated in the next section. As a result, the compromise reached
by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin, and currently the law, recognizes a proportionality principle in the
Eighth Amendment but one which it is nearly impossible for the state not to satisfy.
4.

Categorical Bars to the Death Penalty

The final principle of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that has been recognized by the
Supreme Court is thatthe death penalty cannot be imposed on certain types of offenders or for
certain classes of crimes. Though similar to the proportionality principle, the objective line between
death and all other punishments has allowed the Court to treat this area as a self-contained sphere of
jurisprudence.140 Pursuant to this line of jurisprudence, the death penalty cannot be imposed for
most offenses not resulting in death,141 or for felony murderwhere the d efendant does not himself
kill, and does not at least display reckless disregard for human life and play a major role in the
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See Gilchrist, supra note 138, at 1136 (opining that courts “must look to the judgments of many legislatures
for an approximation of current norms of proportional punishment for the crime in question”).
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See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (plurality) (“[T]his line of authority [i]s an aspect of
[the Court’s] death penalty jurisprudence, rather than as a generalizable aspect of Eighth Amendment law.”); Hutto,
454 U.S. at 373 (“[W]e distinguish[] between punishments – such as the death penalty – which by their very nature
differ from all other forms of punishment, and punishments which differ from others only in duration.”); Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“Because a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment .
. . our decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases are of limited assistance .
. . .”).
141

See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality); id. at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (opining that death penalty is always “cruel and unusual”); id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)
(same); see also Lee, supra note 84, at 721. A broad reading of Coker leads to the conclusion that the death penalty
is barred for any crime unless death results, while, pursuant to a narrower reading, the death penalty is still
permissible for some non-homicidal conduct. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (La. 1996) (“The
[Coker] plurality took great pains in referring only to the rape of adult women throughout their opinion, leaving
open the question of the rape of a child.”) (footnote and emphasis omitted).
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underlying crime.142 In addition, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the mentally retarded143 or
on those who killed before reaching the age of eighteen years.144
The methodology used in these “categorical bar” cases is similar to that used in the noncapital disproportionality cases.145 Again, the Court has developed a two-part test. First, the Court
looks to objective evidence,146 by conducting an inter-jurisdictional analysis looking primarily147 to
how many jurisdictions authorize capital punishment to one in the offender’s position,148 and
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See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787-88 (1982); see also
Lee, supra note 84, at 721.
143

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); see also Lee, supra note 84, at 721..
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See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, (2005); see also Lee, supra note 84, at 721. In addition, the Court
has held that the Constitution forbids execution of the insane. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10
(1986). This differs somewhat from the “categorical bar” cases, for each of those addresses constraints on the
ability of governments to impose the sentence, while Ford constrains only their ability to execute the sentence.
However, the methodology used by the Ford Court to reach this conclusion was consistent with the methodology
used in the “categorical bar” cases.
145

See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 122, at 58-59 (noting similarity between the two tests).
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See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (“Proportionality review . . . should be informed by objective factors to the
maximum extent possible.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (“[W]e
have looked to objective evidence of how our society views a particular punishment today.”); Ford, 477 U.S. at 406
(“[T]his Court takes into account objective evidence of contemporary values before determining whether a particular
punishment comports with the fundamental human dignity that the [Eighth] Amendment protects.”).
147

See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1192 (“The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as
expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.”) (emphasis added);
Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 (“The clearest and most reliable evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted
by the country’s legislatures.”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 849 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“[T]he decisions of American legislatures . . . about the minimum age at which a juvenile’s crimes may
lead to capital punishment . . . should provide the most reliable signs of a society-wide consensus on this issue.”);
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152 (1987) (“[W]e find the state legislatures’ judgment as to proportionality in these
circumstances relevant to th[e] constitutional inquiry.”)
148

See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1192 (finding that 20 States allow execution for crime committed while under age
of eighteen); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15 (finding that 20 States allow execution of mentally retarded); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (finding that 25 states permitted execution of seventeen year-old offenders
and 22 permitted execution of sixteen year-old offenders); Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (finding that 34 states permitted
execution of mentally retarded); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829 (plurality) (finding that of “the 18 States that have
expressly established a minimum age in their death-penalty statutes . . . all of them require that the defendant have
attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the capital offense”); Tison, 481 U.S. at 154 (“[O]nly 11 States
authorizing capital punishment forbid imposition of the death penalty even though the defendant’s participation in
the felony murder is major and the likelihood of killing is so substantial as to raise an inference of extreme
recklessness.”); Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (“[N]o State in the Union permits the execution of the insane.”); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789 (1982) (“[O]nly eighth jurisdictions authorize imposition of the death penalty solely for
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secondarily to how often, where authorized, juries impose the punishment under like
circumstances.149 The Court has also performed an intra-jurisdictional analysis in some cases by
looking to the judgments of juries within the jurisdiction in question.150 The objective approach is
required in part by the Eighth Amendment’s text, which, again, forbids “only those punishments that
are both cruel and unusual,’”151 and in part by the requirement of deference to legislative judgments
in “our federal system.”152
Second, the Court uses a more subjective analysis,153 bringing its “own judgment . . . to
bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”154

participation in a robbery in which another robber takes a life.”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977)
(plurality) (finding that only one jurisdiction authorized capital punishment for rape of adult woman). Beginning in
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16, the Court also: looked to “the consistency and direction of change” among jurisdictions
in limiting the death penalty to certain offenses and offenders; considered how “overwhelmingly” such limitations
have been approved; and took into account “the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than
legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime.” See also Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1193. In some
cases, the inter-jurisdictional analysis has taken into account non-American, and even non-common-law,
jurisdictions. See, e.g., id. at 1198-1200.
149

See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1192 (“[E]ven in the 20 States without a formal prohibition on executing juveniles,
the practice is infrequent.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (“[E]ven in those States that allow the execution of mentally
retarded offenders, the practice is uncommon.”); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795 (finding that only three of 796 thencurrent death row prisoners “did not participate in the fatal assault on the victim” and neither “hired [n]or solicited
someone else to kill the victim [n]or participated in a scheme designed to kill the victim”). The Court in Stanford,
492 U.S. at 374, warned that care should be taken in relying too heavily on this factor, since “the very considerations
which induce [some] to believe that death should never be imposed on offenders under 18 cause prosecutors and
juries to believe that it should rarely be imposed.”
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See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795 (finding that, of the “[f]orty-five felony murderers . . . currently on
[Florida’s] death row,” only one – petitioner – neither killed nor intended to kill); Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality)
(finding that 90% of Georgia juries rejected capital punishment for rapists).
151

Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-70 (emphasis in Stanford); see also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822 n.7 (plurality)
(“[C]ontemporary standards, as reflected by the actions of legislatures and juries, provide an important measure of
whether the death penalty is cruel and unusual’ [in part because] whether an action is unusual’ depends, in
common usage, upon the frequency of its occurrence or the magnitude of its acceptance.”).
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Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-70.

153

See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (“[T]he objective evidence, though of great importance, d[oes] not wholly
determine’ the controversy.”) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality)).
154

Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality). Accord Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1192 (2005); Atkins, 536
U.S. at 313; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833 (plurality); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797; Lee, supra note 84, at 189.
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Here, the Court looks at the culpability of the defendant and the harm he has caused, in comparison
to the typical first-degree murderer. If the defendant is less culpable or caused less harm than the
typical first-degree murderer, then death is a disproportionate punishment because not even all firstdegree murderers are deserving of the death penalty.155 In an overlapping, sometimes
indistinguishable, inquiry, the Court asks whether, in light of the defendant’s level of culpability, his
execution would meaningfully advance – that is, advance by some meaningful increment beyond
what would be achieved by imposition of a lesser sentence –either of the accepted goals of capital
punishment, retribution and deterrence.156 If not, then imposition of the death penalty “is nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,” forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment.157
Like the Court’s disproportionality analysis, its categorical bar methodology has its
detractors both on and off the Court. The subjective portion of the analysis, predictably, has been
dismissed as merely a seat-of-the-pants determination based on nothing more than the personal
preferences of a majority of the sitting Justices.158 Yet even the objective portion of the analysis is
subject to criticism. At first blush, theinter -jurisdictional analysis “can be applied with clarity and
ease.”159 However, after the Court has added up the jurisdictions on either side of the ledger, it must
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See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1195-96; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833
(plurality); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 155-58 (1987); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798; Coker, 433 U.S. at 598
(plurality). Accord Lee, supra note 84, at 689-90.
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See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1196-97; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-20; Penry, 492 U.S. at 335; Thompson, 487 U.S.
at 833 (plurality); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-801; Lee, supra note 84, at 690. In Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-17 n.21, the
Court also looked to such indicia as: the opinions of professional organizations; the stance of religious groups; and
public opinion data.
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Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality); accord Penry, 492 U.S. at 335; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
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See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (plurality) (“[T]o mean that . . . it is for us to
judge . . . on the basis of what we think proportionate’ and measurably contributory to the acceptable goals of
punishment’ . . . is to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings.”).
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Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (plurality).
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then decide how many jurisdictions must eschew capital punishment in a particular context before a
national consensus has been reached. Some cases, of course, are easier than others. In Coker v.
Georgia, the Court observed that Georgia was the only jurisdiction that authorized execution for the
rape of an adult woman.160 But in two more recent cases, the Court held that there was a national
consensus against execution of the mentally retarded and those who committed their crimes as
juveniles, even though in each case only 60% of the States, and only 47% of the States with the
death penalty, precluded its use in those contexts.161 This has led even some Justices in the majority
in those cases to concede that such objective evidence is truly insufficient to demonstrate a national
consensus, and that the subjective aspect of the test was really driving those decisions.162 In turn,
this has opened the Court up to even more criticism that its categorical bar jurisprudence simply
reflects the personal preferences of a majority of the Justices.163
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433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977) (plurality).

161

See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1192 (2005) (finding that 20 of 38 death penalty States allow
execution for crime committed while under age of eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002)
(finding that 20 of 38 death penalty States allow execution of mentally retarded). Roper and Atkins brought to the
surface a subsidiary debate within the Court: whether to include non-death penalty States in the denominator when
determining whether there is a national consensus. Compare Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005)
(“[T]he Stanford Court should have considered those States that had abandoned the death penalty altogether as part
of the consensus against the death penalty . . . .”) with id. at 1219 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“None of our cases dealing
with an alleged constitutional limitation upon the death penalty has counted, as States supporting a consensus in
favor of that limitation, States that have eliminated the death penalty entirely.”) (emphasis omitted).
162

See, e.g., Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1212 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he objective evidence of national
consensus, standing alone, was insufficient to dictate the Court’s holding in Atkins.”). Justice O’Connor had been
in the majority in Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305.
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See, e.g., Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1221 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Of course, the real force driving today’s
decision is not the actions of [the]state legislatures but the Court’s own judgment’ that murderers younger than 18
can never be as morally culpable as older counterparts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal
views of its Members.”).
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III. THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT
All of the applications of the Eighth Amendment discussed above have at least one thing
in common: none distinguishes the Eighth Amendment in its pristine form from the Amendment as
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. Since 1962, when the Eighth Amendment was
held to bind the States,164 both courts and commentators have assumed that the same Eighth
Amendment standards – whatever those might be – apply in an identical fashion to the federal and
State governments.165 Indeed, the two main cases applying the “pure” Eighth Amendment, Weems
v. United States166 and Trop v. Dulles,167 have greatly influenced the development of “incorporated”
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, through their dynamic rather than static view of the Amendment
and their use of comparative analysis among and within jurisdictions. Conventional wisdom thus
holds that there is no “pure” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence distinct from the Court’s
“incorporated” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
However, recent research reveals that the criminal procedure protections of the Bill of
Rights were adopted primarily to make it more difficult for the federal government to investigate,
prosecute, convict, and punish people for crime, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
This function contrasts sharply with the reliability-enhancing rationale ascribed to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This distinction suggests that the Bill of Rights applies more
stringently to the federal government than it does to the States, a notion that makes perfect sense in
light of the communitarian ideology of the Anti-Federalists, who insisted on the inclusion in the
Constitution of the Bill of Rights. After all, there is no more fundamental way in which citizens can
164

See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
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But see Packer, supra note 89, at 1074 n.11 (briefly suggesting that different standards might apply).

166

217 U.S. 349 (1910).

167

356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality).
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be excluded from their communities, literally or figuratively, than bysubject ing them to the criminal
sanction. It is this potential power to exclude by the new central government that was among the
most feared by the Anti-Federalists. The Anti-Federalists’ desire to hobble the federal government’s
power to re-shape local communities through federal criminal law extended naturally to the federal
power to punish, for punishment, even upon a properly-obtained federal conviction, dictates the
nature, length, and extent of a citizen’s exclusion from his community.
A.

The Anti-Federalists and the Bill of Rights
We tend to think of the Bill of Rights as a charter of freedom that puts a thumb on the

scale on the side of “the individual” against that abstraction known as “the state.”168 In this
paradigm, it matters not whether “the state” is the local or the national government. Both are equally
capable of arbitrarily or maliciously taking our freedom, of reducing citizens to the status of mere
subjects. Indeed, for moderns, living in the aftermath of Jim Crow and the modern civil rights
movement, it is near gospel that we have more to fear from local government than from the national
government.169
But what is orthodoxy now was heterodoxy in 1791. The Anti-Federalists of that period
“saw state legislatures and state courts as the protectors of citizens and not as threats.”170 What they
feared was the newly created central government. George C. Thomas, III invites us back into time:
Return to the 1790s. The States eye the central government, to which they have
just ceded much of their sovereignty, as a potential bully or, worse, a tyrant. The
168

See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 34 (1998) (“[T]he conventional
assumption [is] that virtually all the provisions of the Bill of Rights . . . were essentially designed to protect
individual rights.”).
169

See id. at 4 (“[M]any lawyers embrace a tradition that views state governments as the quintessential threat
to individual and minority rights, and federal officials – especially federal courts – as the special guardians of those
rights”).
170

Thomas, supra note 53, at 180.

36

States look upon the freshly minted central government as it looms above them,
and it reminds them of King George III and Parliament.171
It is well known that the Constitution was ratified by many states on the implicit condition that a Bill
of Rights be added shortly thereafter to assuage these fears.172 The underlying premises of the AntiFederalists, then, are critical to an understanding of the Bill of Rights, for without their assent, the
Constitution might never have been ratified.173
Close scrutiny of the Anti-Federalists’ Bill of Rights reveals it to be profoundly concerned
with preserving state sovereignty as a means of furthering liberty. Though framed in terms of
protecting the rights of individuals, the Bill of Rights was viewed in 1791 as a barrier between the
States and the national government.174 Whilet o moderns, the Bill of Rights is countermajoritarian,175 to the ancients, exactly the opposite was true: the Bill of Rights, as originally
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Id. at 149. See also Calvin Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and Its Implications for State
Constitutional Law, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1229, 1231 (asserting that the Bill of Rights is “a constitutional antidote to
the potential excesses of national power so feared by the Anti-Federalists”).

172

See Saul A. Cornell, The Changing Historical Fortunes of the Anti-Federalists, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 39, 66
(1989) (“[R]atification of the Constitution was only secured because Federalists agreed to consider subsequent
amendments recommended by Anti-Federalists in various state conventions.”); Massey, supra note 171, at 1236
(“[T]he Anti-Federalist opposition [to the Constitution] shifted to a reluctant acceptance of the instrument provided
that appropriate constitutional restraints were placed upon the powers of the federal government.’”) (quoting
Wilmarth, The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James Madison and the Founders’ Search for a Workable
Balance Between Federal and State Power, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1261, 1276 (1989)); Thomas, supra note 53, at
157 (observing that Bill of Rights was added “to satisfy the anti-Federalists”).
173

See Cornell, supra note 172, at 67 (“Anti-Federalist intentions are relevant to understanding the
Constitution; without their acquiescence ratification might never have been secured. * * * In particular, AntiFederalist political thought is essential to understanding the meaning of the Bill of Rights.”). This is not to imply
that Anti-Federalist theory was monolithic. See Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, reprinted in
1 Herbert J. Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist 5 (1981) (“It would be difficult to find a single point about which
all of the Anti-Federalists agreed.”). It is only to say that certain themes were heavily emphasized in Anti-Federalist
thought.
174

See Thomas, supra note 53, at 149. See also Massey, supra note 171, at 1231 (contending that the “ AntiFederalist constitution’ [is] concerned with preserving the states as autonomous units of government and as
structural bulwarks of human liberty”).
175

See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1203 (1991) (“Today, the
very phrase Bill of Rights’ is virtually synonymous with a compilation of countermajoritarian personal rights.”).
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conceived, was a stridently majoritarian document.176 The Bill was primarily concerned with
lowering what Akhil Amar has dubbed the “agency costs” of representative democracy.177 The
Anti-Federalists knew that because the number of the people’s representatives in the nation’s capital
would be relatively small, only the aristocratic few, “with reputations over wide geographic areas,”
would be well known enough to be elected.178 The Anti-Federalists feared that these aristocratic
“representatives” would be truly un-representative, given their distance, both physical and psychic,
from the “middling classes” that made up the mass of the people.179 The danger was that the
people’s national representatives, far removed from the concerns of the communities they purported
to represent, would be motivated more by self-interest than by civic virtue.180 State legislators, by
contrast, because they would be drawn from smaller geographic regions, would be more familiar to
176

See id. at 1202 (“[T]he world view underlying the Bill of Rights was not dominated by the idea of
individualistic, countermajoritarian rights.”); Amar, supra note 168, at xii (“The genius of the Bill was . . . not to
impede popular majorities but to empower them.”); see also Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic,
1776-1787, at 520 (“[Anti-federalists were localists,’ fearful of distant governmental, even representational,
authority for very significant political and social reasons that in the final analysis must be called democratic.”).
177

See Amar, supra note 168, at xiii.
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Id. at 11; see also Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Anti-Federalists, Representation, and Party, 84 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 12, 30 (1989 (“The Anti-Federalists . . . believed [that] a large republic with a fragmented and dispersed
citizenry gave decisive advantages to organized elites – specifically, government officials, the wealthy, and men of
commerce.”); Letter from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 4, 1788), reprinted in 2 Storing, supra note 173, at 276 (“[T]he
best practical representation, even in a small state, must be several degrees more aristocratical than the body of the
people.”); Speech by Melancton Smith (June 21, 1788), reprinted in 6 Storing, supra note 173, at 157 (“[T]his
Government is so constituted, that the representatives will generally be composed of . . . the natural aristocracy of
the country.”).
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Amar, supra note 168, at 11; see also McWilliams, supra note 178, at 25 (“The Anti-Federalists . . . argued
that . . . in large states, rulers could know their people only as so many abstractions.”); Carol M. Rose, The Ancient
Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84
Nw. U. L. Rev. 74, 90 (1989) (noting the Anti-Federalists’ fear that their “so-called representatives, ignorant of their
constituents’ needs, and both literally and psychically distant from their constituents, would pass laws that were
unsuited to the different parts of the republic”); Speech by Melancton Smith (June 21, 1788), reprinted in 6 Storing,
supra note 173, at 157 (“[R]epresentatives [should] resemble those they represent; they should be a true picture of
the people; possess the knowledge of their circumstances and their wants; sympathize in all their distresses, and be
disposed to seek their true interests.”); 3 Elliot, supra note 85, at 322 (statement of Patrick Henry) (“[I]nstead of a
confidential connection between the electors and the elected, they will be absolutely unacquainted with each
other.”).
180

See Amar, supra note 168, at xiii.
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their constituents and more familiar with local conditions, and therefore more trustworthy.181 The
Bill of Rights was proposed and adopted as a method of cutting back on the potential self-dealing on
the part of the people’s national representatives by facilitating “the ability of local governments to
monitor and deter federal abuse.”182
The notion that a responsive and representative local authority could provide a check on
the abuses of an unrepresentative central authority was deeply ingrained in the minds of the framers.
At the time of the framing, many of the State governments were well into their second century.183 In
the dozen years or so from 1763 until the Revolution began, “colonial governments took the lead in
protecting their citizens from perceived Parliamentary abuses. Colonial legislatures kept a close eye
on the central government; sounded public alarms whenever they saw oppression in the works; and
organized political, economic, and (ultimately) military opposition to perceived British evils.”184
The idea here is not that the Bill of Rights was designed to protectcollective rights rather
than individual rights. To the contrary, the Anti-Federalists saw the two as fairly
indistinguishable.185 The prevailing Anti-Federalist thought at the time viewed individuals as
primarily constituent parts of the community.186 Accordingly, the fortunes of the individual were
181

See id. at 11; accord Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, reprinted in 1 Storing, supra
note 173, at 17.
182

Amar, supra note 168, at xiii.
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See id. at 5 (pointing out that the Virginia “House of Burgesses had been meeting since the 1620s”).

184

Id. See also id. at 4 (“[The] states’ rights tradition . . . extoll[ed] the ability of local governments to protect
citizens against abuses by central authorities.”).
185

See id. at 128 (‘[The] point is not that substantive rights are unimportant, but that these rights were
intimately intertwined with structural considerations.”).
186

See McWilliams, supra note 178, at19(noting the Anti -Federalist view that “[i]ndividuality is possible only
because political society protects and nurtures our individual strengths and attributes, making it possible for each of
us to do what he or she does best”); id. at 19-20 (“It was common for Anti-Federalists to argue . . . that political
societies, once created, became one body,’ a collective second nature that subsumes and supersedes all or most
individual rights.”) (footnote omitted) (quoting Speech by Melancton Smith (June 20, 1788), reprinted in 6 Storing,
supra note 173, at 149, 153).
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intimately intertwined with the fortunes of his fellow citizens as a collective whole.187 The ultimate
goal was preservation of individual liberty and self-determination by protectingthe collective rights
of “the people,” a phrase that is repeated five times in the Bill.188 Thus, individual rights and
collective rights are often “marbled together” in the provisions of the Bill.189
Unfortunately, this original view of the Bill of Rights has been lost to the courts and all but
a few scholars. Since most of the modern Supreme Court cases interpreting the Bill of Rights have
come from the States, they have really been interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Given
the focus of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment on the protection of former
slaves and other minorities – ethnic, religious, and political – from dominant local majorities, that
Amendment has a distinctively individual-rights hue.190 This, in turn, has colored the way we think
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See Amar, supra note 168, at 126 (quoting leading Anti-Federalists who expressly conjoined concerns for
both individual and states’ rights); see also id. at xii (“A close look at the Bill reveals structural ideas tightly
interconnected with language of rights . . . .”); Michael J. Mannheimer, Equal Protection Principles and the
Establishment Clause: Equal Participation in the Community as the Central Link, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 95, 113 (1996)
(“[B]ecause the anti-federalists felt that individuals are defined primarily by their communities, they stressed the
interconnections and interdependencies between individuals and society.”); McWilliams, supra note 178, at 24
(observing that Anti-Federalists “link[ed] [individual] well-being with that of the community”); Herbert J. Storing,
What the Anti-Federalists Were For, reprinted in 1 Storing, supra note 173, at 15 (“The Anti-Federalists’ defense of
federalism and of the primacy of the states rested on their belief that there was an inherent connection between the
states and the preservation of individual liberty, which is the end of any legitimate government.”).
188

See U.S. Const., amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably
to assemble . . . .”); id. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”); id.
amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers, houses, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); id. amend IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); id. amend X (“The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
189

Amar, supra note 168, at 222. It must be conceded that even some Anti-Federalists admitted to a more
modern understanding of the Bill of Rights as a means of “secur[ing] the minority against the usurpation and
tyranny of the majority.” Letter of Agrippa to the Massachusetts Convention (Feb. 5, 1788), reprinted in 4 Storing,
supra note 173, at 111. See also Essay by a Farmer (Feb. 15, 1788), reprinted in 5 Storing, supra note 173, at 15
(“[T]he rights of individuals are frequently opposed to the apparent interests of the majority – For this reason the
greater the portion of political freedom in a form of government the greater the necessity of a bill of rights . . . .”).
However, these sentiments were rarely expressed by the Anti-Federalists.
190

See Amar, supra note 168, at 7 (“Through the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the Bill has been pressed into the
service of protecting vulnerable minorities from dominant social majorities. Given the core concerns of the
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about the provisions of the Bill of Rights itself, since, through the fiction of incorporation, we
pretend we are interpreting the first eight Amendments rather than the Fourteenth.191 Thus, we think
of the Bill of Rights as emphasizing individual rights, even though the Bill itselfwas – and is – far
more concerned with federalism, popular sovereignty, and collective rights than we typically
acknowledge.192
Some have gone so far as to suggest a “two-track” model for at least some of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, proposing different constraints when those provisions are applied to
the States than when they are applied to the federal government.193 After all, while the Fourteenth
Amendment arguably incorporates the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the States, it “did not

Fourteenth Amendment, all this is fitting . . . . ”); id. at 23 (noting that Fourteenth Amendment “focuses more on
overweening majoritarianism than attenuated representation”).
191

See id. at 7 (“Like people with spectacles who often forget that they are wearing them, most lawyers read
the Bill of Rights through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment without realizing how powerfully that lens has
refracted what they see.”); see also Amar, supra note 175, at 1201 (‘[A]doption of the Fourteenth Amendment
appears to have transformed the nature of the Bill.”).
192

See McWilliams, supra note 178, at 20 (“In advocating a Bill of Rights, the Anti-Federalists most zealously
defended public freedoms and the right to a republican civil life.”); see also Amar, supra note 168, at 23 (“[P]opular
speech was the paradigm of our First Amendment . . . .”); id. at 26 (“The right of the people to assemble does not
simply protect the ability of self-selected clusters of individuals to meet together; it is also an express reservation of
the collective right of We the People to assemble . . . .”) (emphasis omitted); id. at 30 (“As with assembly, the core
petition right is collective and popular . . . .”); id. at 55-56 (“[T]he militia system [protected by the Second
Amendment] was carefully designed to protect liberty through localism. [F]reedom and federalism pulled
together.”); id. at 67-68 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment evinces at least as much concern with the agency problem of
protecting the people generally from self-interested government policy as with protecting minorities against
majorities of fellow citizens.”); id. at 82 (“[M]ost [of the] provisions of Amendments V-VIII were centrally
concerned with the agency problem – the danger that government officials might attempt to rule in their own selfinterest at the expense of their constituents’ sentiments and liberty.”).
193

See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n the context
of the Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms than similar
action by the Federal Government.”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 699 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“It
may . . . be that the States, while bound to observe strict neutrality [with regard to religion], should be freer to
experiment with involvement – on a neutral basis – than the Federal Government.”); Mannheimer, supra note 185, at
142-43 (suggesting that a “two-track” model apply to the Establishment Clause). At least three Justices have
suggested such a “two-track” model for the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 501, 504 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 288, 294-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). See also Mannheimer, supra note 185, at 140-42 (discussing merits of this view).

41

repeal the fundamentally populist philosophy of the original Constitution and Bill of Rights.”194
Thus, Amar advocates what he calls “refined incorporation,” by which only those provisions of the
Bill of Rights that guarantee an individual right, “rather than a right of states or the public at large,”
are incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.195 Moreover, even those provisions that are
incorporated might apply in different ways to the States than when applied to the federal
government.196 Recent research reveals that the criminal procedure protections of the Bill of Rights
are particularly susceptible of such a “two-track” interpretation.
B.

The Original Purpose of the Criminal Procedure Protections of the Bill of Rights
While Amar declines to apply a “two-track” model to the criminal procedure protections

of the Bill of Rights,197 George Thomas picks up where Amar leaves off. In a recent work, Thomas
shows that these provisions were “not designed with accuracy of outcome as the primary goal.”198
Rather, “the Framers of the Bill of Rights intended them to be formidable barriers to the successful
federal prosecution of criminal defendants, whether guilty or innocent.”199 Indeed, “the Framers
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Amar, supra note 168, at 103.
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Id. at xiv.
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See id.
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See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles (1997) (positing
unitary theory of criminal procedure protections); see also Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and
Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1559, 1562 n.19 (1996) (book
review) (noting that “Amar’s refined incorporation’ is not invoked” in Amar’s work on criminal procedure); id. at
1563 (“[Amar] believes in a single, national set of individual rights against criminal investigation and prosecution . .
. .”).

198

Thomas, supra note 53, at 152; see also id. at 174 (“We have come to believe . . . that the reason to have
protections benefiting criminals is that these protections best deliver accurate verdicts . . . .”).
199

Id. at 152 (emphasis added). See also id. at 156 (“[T]he Bill of Rights . . . sought to impose restrictions on
the federal government without regard to the innocence of particular defendants.”); id. at 160 (“The principal
concern in the Bill of Rights was not to protect innocent defendants. The Framers instead intended to create
formidable obstacles to federal investigation and prosecution of crime”); id. at 174-75 (“The Framers did not focus
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almost surely intended the Bill of Rights to permit guilty defendants to go free.”200 On this reading,
the criminal procedure protections of the Bill of Rights, like the rest of the Bill, are “profoundly
antigovernment.”201 It is only because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
primarily concerned with protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction and punishment, and
because most of our current jurisprudence stems from that Amendment, thatwe believe the criminal
procedure protections of the Bill of Rights themselves to be concerned with the accuracy of trials.202
Again, we are entranced by the optical illusion of incorporation.
This view largely explains why the Anti-Federalists cared so much about preserving and
fortifying the right to trial by jury in criminal cases.203 Although Article III of the Constitution
already guaranteed trial by jury to “be held in the State where the . . . Crimes shall have been
committed,”204 the Anti-Federalists spent much energy advocating for an even stricter rule. This
rule, which ultimately found its way into the Sixth Amendment, goes even further, in two respects:
first, it guarantees also that the trial take place, not just in the “State” where the crime was
committed, but also within the “district”; and second, it guarantees also that the jury come from that

on separating the guilty from the innocent because they were concerned with curtailing the power of federal
prosecutors and judges.”).
200

Id. at 156.

201
Id at 175; see also id. at 232 (“[T]he Bill of Rights . . . was fundamentally antigovernment. It was not
designed to produce fair outcomes or reasonable accommodations to permit more effective crime control. It was
designed to hobble the federal prosecution of crime.”).
202

See Dripps, supra note 197, at 1637 (“[P]reventing punishment outside the criminal process, and ensuring
that the criminal process does all it can to prevent unjust convictions, are the core ideas of due process of law.”); id.
(“Arbitrary searches and seizures deprive people of liberty without due process, for it is the prospect of a valid
prosecution that justifies coercive methods of investigation.”).
203

See Amar, supra note 168, at 83 (“The dominant strategy to keep agents of the central government under
control was to use the populist and local institution of the jury.”); Thomas, supra note 53, at 176 (“[I]t was
correcting the Article III jury right that was the passion of the anti-Federalists.”).
204

U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, para. 3.
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same State and district.205 The Anti-Federalists believed that the jury, in its role as the voice of the
local community,206 could be counted on to sympathize with a defendant who was being persecuted
by the federal government, even if he were guilty.207 The jury was “interpose[d] between the
citizens and the central government as a way to place stringent limitations on the federal
government.”208 This tactic was familiar to the Framers. Prior to the Revolution, when locals
disloyal to the Crown were tried for violating such validbut unpopular laws as those prohibiting
smuggling, the defendants often could count on local juries to acquit against the evidence.209 The
Anti-Federalists’ focus on these particulars of the jury-trial right strengthens the inference that the
Bill of Rights was not primarily intended to protect just the innocent, for their preoccupation would
be “an odd historical fact if protecting innocence were uppermost in the minds of the Framers.”210
The Anti-Federalists were insistent on throwing the procedural hurdles of the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments in the paths of federal investigators, prosecutors, and judges,
because, just as “the power to tax involves the power to destroy,”211 the power to prosecute is the
power to persecute. “The Framers feared that the powerful federal government would seek to
205

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial[] by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .” U.S. Const., amend VI.
206

See Thomas, supra note 53, at 177 (“The colonists wanted not truth so much as the voice and the law of the
community.”); see also Amar, supra note 168, at 88-89 (“[T]he jury would be composed of citizens from the same
community, and its actions were expected to be informed by community values.”).
207
See Amar, supra note 168, at 84 (“[T]he jury played a leading role in protecting ordinary individuals
against governmental overreaching.”).
208

Thomas, supra note 53, at 177; see also Amar, supra note 168, at 87 (“[T]he criminal petit jury could
interpose itself on behalf of the people’s rights by refusing to convict when the executive sought to trump up charges
against its political critics . . . .”); Thomas, supra note 53, at 179 (“[A] jury who knows the defendant’s character
will nullify a prosecution that was viewed as overreaching on the part of the federal government, without regard to
whether the defendant was factually guilty.”).
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See Thomas, supra note 53, at 176-77.
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Id. at 156.
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M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
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persecute its enemies through the use of federal law.”212 Again, the Framers had seen this before.
After all, “many of the Framers themselves had violated British [criminal] law.”213 “[F]resh from
[their] experience as smugglers, tax evaders, seditionists, and traitors to the regime of George III,”214
the Framers identified and empathized with those enmeshed in the criminal justice system and guilty
of laws that were, to them, unjust.215 Moreover, just as King George had concentrated his efforts on
the colonists, the same power to persecute via unpopular criminal laws might be used by the federal
government to target particular sections of the nation.216 Before the Bill of Rights was ratified, this
is what the Anti-Federalists saw:
[A] powerful federal government that wanted to eradicate its enemies. The
legislature might enact general search warrants that could be used to sweep
buildings, neighborhoods, and whole towns, looking not for evidence of crimes
of violence or theft but, instead, for evidence of opposition to the government.
[A] grand jury could subpoena those suspected of harboring antigovernment
sentiments and force them to answer questions about their activities and their
friends under threat of contempt. [P]rosecutors could bring a criminal
prosecution in a corner of the State far from where the alleged crime occurred;
the defendant would be unknown and without friends and resources to assist in
his defense. If the judge set bail impossibly high, the defendant could be held in
jail for months or years waiting for the prosecution to proceed. When trial did
finally begin, under the supervision of a lax federal judge, it could be done
largely by affidavit . . . without a lawyer for the defendant and without access to
subpoena power to compel attendance of defense witnesses. And if the
defendant somehow escaped with an acquittal, or with a sentence that the
prosecutor found too lenient, the prosecutor could prosecute the same offense
all over again.217
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Thus, the Fifth Amendment, save for its final clause, and the entirety of the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments, specifically address the procedures to be followed in criminal cases. And although the
Fourth Amendment does not, strictly speaking, apply only in thecriminal arena, its limits on the
powers of investigation in the pre-regulatory state surely had its predominant impact on the criminal
process.218
Why does the prospect of a government’s abuse of the criminal law engender such fear,
for us as much as for the Anti-Federalists? Certainly, a tyrannical central government might use the
civil courts to persecute and torment its adversaries as well. It might bankrupt its enemies by
exacting stiff forfeitures and civil fines for violations of federal law.219 To be sure, the AntiFederalists fought for the right to trial by jury in federal civil matters as well as in criminal cases.
Yet the provisions of the Bill of Rights pertaining exclusively to civil trials – the Civil Jury
Clause,220 the Reexamination Clause,221 and the civil application of the Due Process Clause222 – are
duplicative of, and not nearly as extensive as, those occasioning criminal trials. To be sure, the
primary check on the central government in criminal cases as well as civil was “the populist and
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local institution of the jury.”223 One may ask why, in addition to the jury-trial rights, the AntiFederalists insisted on all of the other accoutrements of the criminal process contained in the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.224 The answer lies in the recognition of the Anti-Federalists’
deep respect for the value of community participation, and their deep fear of the central
government’s potential ability to re- shape local communities through the criminal law.
C.

The Criminal Conviction and Its Impact on Community Participation
The value of community participation was a central tenet in Anti-Federalist thought.225

Indeed, the Anti-Federalists valued local autonomy over centralized governance precisely because
de-centralized decisionmaking “would enable the people to participate more directly, through debate
and dialogue, in the decisions that would affect their lives.”226 As Hanna Pitkin has summarized this
view, “the distinctive promise of political freedom remains the possibility of genuine collective
action, an entire community consciously and jointly shaping its policy, its way of life.”227 Such
collective action through widespread participation yields benefits for the polity itself. First, those
who actively participate in the political life of the community “have more of a stake in the outcome
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for their community and will concern themselves with public, as opposed to private, issues.”228 In
addition, widespread participation in community affairs fosters a sense of legitimacy and confidence
regarding the outcomes of the political process. This sense of legitimacy obviates the desire for
those who find themselves on the losing side of an issue to resort to extra-legal means to attain their
goals.229 Thus, active participation in the political life of the community by its constituent members
is essential for the prosperity and well-being of the community itself.230
The Anti-Federalists’ focus on active community participation explains their deep
concern with the specter of the new federal government’s using the criminal law as a tool of
oppression. The criminal process is unique in its ability to strip people of citizenship, of their right
to participate fully in the political life of the community. A citizen who has lost a civil case is bit
lighter in the wallet, perhaps, but still a citizen. His vote in local and national elections still counts
as much as anyone else’s; he is still eligible to serve on juries and in militias; and his voice still
carries the same authority it had had before.
By stark contrast, a criminal conviction has always been treated differently. By dint of a
criminal conviction, the lawbreaker is both actually and constructively excluded from the political
community. Most obviously, the coercive sanction itself works a permanent or temporary physical
exclusion of the outlaw from the community: execution permanently and completely excludes the
lawbreaker, while imprisonment and banishment work a complete exclusion of the outlaw from the
228
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community either permanently or temporarily.231 In addition, those convicted of felonies are
typically disenfranchised: they may not hold office, sit on juries, or vote.232 In some States today,
this disenfranchisement is permanent.233 In nearly all, it lasts at least as long as the felon is serving
his sentence.234 And, critically, most state disenfranchisement laws do not distinguish between state
and federal offenders.235 That is, those convicted of federal felonies are disenfranchised from
participating in matters of State governance. Thus it is that the federal government, through use or
abuse of the power of the criminal process, could greatly affect the composition of the polity at the
State level.
But there is more. Even beyond the literal exclusion from the political community that
comes with such punishments as execution, imprisonment, banishment, and disenfranchisement ,
those convicted of a crime carry another serious disability into the political arena. What truly
distinguishes criminal from civil liability is that, in Henry Hart’s oft-quoted words, a criminal
conviction entails the “formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the
community.”236 There is a distinctive expressive component to criminal punishment.237 The
criminal conviction stigmatizes in a way that the civil judgment does not.238
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This stigma can understandably be expected to detract from one’s voice in the political
process.239 After all, political participation potentially consists of more than running for office or
casting a vote. Participation includes all “arenas of citizenship in the comparably broad sense in
which citizenship encompasses not just formal participation in affairs of state but also respected and
self-respecting presence – distinct and audible voice – in public and social life at large.”240 As Carol
Rose cogently observed:
[V]oting may well be a relatively minor aspect of local civic participation.
Other versions of voice may be much more important locally: the informal
constituent contacts, the PTA meetings, the civic groups’ banging on the door at
city hall, the cub reporters’ scandal-mongering, the highly issue-oriented
jawboning that is the very stuff of local controversy.241
Because all public life involves interactions among citizens, interactions that can potentially shape
the social and political views of the participants, all publiclife is potentially political.242 Thus can a
citizen’s voice be dampened or even muted by the stigma that attaches upon a criminal conviction.
Federal criminal law, then, posed the greatest danger of all to the Anti-Federalists, for
nothing gives a sovereign greater power to reshape communities than the power of the criminal law.
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The Anti-Federalists were not so naïve as to believe that citizens were so uniformly virtuous as to
render the criminal law unnecessary. To the contrary, “they recognized the need for coercion and
constraint” of those disinclined to follow society’s basic norms.243 Yet, they sought to reserve
largely to the States the power to shape the community through the use of the criminal sanction. Just
as the Anti-Federalists sought to retain control over the intermediate associations of jury, militia, and
church,244 so, too, they strived to retain control over the criminal process.
D.

The Anti-Federalists and the Eighth Amendment
It remains to be seen why the Anti-Federalists fought to enshrine the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause in the Constitution. What really frightened them was the prospect of a distant
central government using its power to alter the character of local communities by deciding, remotely,
who could and could not be part of those communities. Given this, it would seem that the criminal
procedure protections contained in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments were sufficient to the
task. Once the hurdles established by these provisions were cleared and a defendant was convicted
despite them, it would seem that the jig was up. The stigma traditionally attached to the convict
would be indelibly applied, his ability to participate in the life of the community forever altered, and
the character of the community changed.
It is true that criminal conviction in and of itself works to exclude the convict from the
community. But the punishment attached to the conviction is also critical, for it dictates the nature,
the extent, and the length of that exclusion. Non-confinement punishments work no additional
exclusion from the community but for the substantial effects of the stigma attaching to the
243
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conviction itself. Such exclusion is merely constructive. Imprisonment, on the other hand, works an
actual exclusion from the community, temporarily or for life. And execution, of course, permanently
and absolutely removes the lawbreaker from his community.
Moreover, the nature, extent, and length of punishment also determine the level of stigma
the community places on a particular offender.245 Some non-confinement punishments, such as the
pillory or ducking stool, were designed almost exclusively to shame the lawbreaker, while others,
such as the imposition of a fine, involve little more stigma than that imposed by the criminal
conviction itself. Still others, such as whipping and branding, appear designed to inflict both pain
and shame on the offender.
Even when comparing two sentences involving the same type of punishment, the amount
or degree of punishment imposed sends a strong message about the community’s view of the
respective crimes. Intuitively, for example, we know that the person who has just served a one-day
sentence in county jail is likely not quite as deserving of our scorn as the person who has just served
twenty-five years in the state penitentiary, even without knowing that the latter offender was
convicted of rape or murder while the former offender’s transgression was spitting on the sidewalk.
“[W]hen the state punishes, how one’s punishment stands in relation to punishments for other crimes
supplies a crucial piece of information as to how wrong the behavior punished is viewed by the
society.”246
The Anti-Federalists wanted largely to reserve to the States the power, not only to
investigate, prosecute, and convict people for crimes, but to determine what kind of punishment, and
how much, each type of transgression would merit. They did not wish to leave to the new federal
245
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government the power to do so, for such authority was part and parcel of the power to re-shape
communities that the Anti-Federalists so feared would fall into the hands of the central government:
[T]he effects of sentencing tend to be localized: the sense of vindication felt by
victims and the community; the deterrence of future crimes in the community; the
defendant’s loss of liberty; and the disruption of relationships between the
defendant and his or her family and friends. [W]hen federal courts impose
nationally determined sentences . . . they inappropriately undermine the integrity
of localized responses.247
Concern over the dramatic “effect[s] of harsh sentences on families, communities, and the offender’s
capacity for rehabilitation,”248 explains why, today as in 1791, States might wish to impose more
lenient punishment on lawbreakers than does the federal government:
When federal incarceration results in the disintegration of a family, state and
local agencies must pick up the pieces. When federal incarceration results in
the removal of young males from a community en masse, the costs are felt
primarily at a state and local level. When federal inmates are returned years
later with poor job prospects and high risks of recidivism, the localized
community suffers again.249
Likewise, “the removal of large numbers of working-age males to prison may cause substantial
social and economic instability, including churning’ in local labor markets that may make the
communities unattractive to businesses.”250
As in many other ways, in reserving to the States the power to define for themselves the
outer limits of the criminal sanction, the Anti-Federalists intertwined notions of individual rights and
state autonomy. Thus, leading Anti-Federalist George Mason expressly invoked both State power
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and individual rights as potentialcasualties of Congress’ feared power, pursuant to the Necessary
and Proper Clause,251 to devise criminal punishments:
Under their own Construction of the general Clause at the End of the
enumerated powers the Congress may grant Monopolies in Trade and
Commerce, constitute new Crimes, inflict unusual and severe Punishments, and
extend their Power as far as they shall think proper; so that the State
Legislatures have no Security for the Powers now presumed to remain to them;
or the People for their Rights.252
This statement is a striking example of the Anti-Federalist concept of the intimate interconnections
between individual and collective rights. The “Powers” of “the State Legislatures” and the “Rights”
of “the People” are thought to be aligned one with the other against the central government.
Moreover, the concern over Congress’ supposed power to “grant Monopolies” – surely, a concern
sounding more in structure than in individual rights – is lumped together with its purported power to
“inflict unusual and severe Punishments.” Though the latter sounds to modern ears as a purely
individual-rights matter, it is not so easily disentangled from structural concerns.
Finally, the Anti-Federalists’ goal, through the Eighth Amendment, of limiting the federal
power to punish fits nicely with a dominant theme in Anti-Federalist thought: minimization of the
use of force by government against citizen. The Anti-Federalists adhered to the notion that, in an
ideal polity, persuasion would be the rule and force the exception. As one prominent Anti-Federalist
wrote: “Our true object is . . . to arm persuasion on every side, and to render force as little necessary
as possible.”253 A government that relied primarily on force of arms to keep order could not truly
call itself republican. Thus, coercion and force would be essential in some instances, but Anti-
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Federalist doctrine called for use of force only in such amounts as would be necessary. The Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause can be explained as a measure designed to keep criminal
punishments from going beyond what was necessary to deter and punish criminals.
IV. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
The problem with all prevailing theories of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is that each addresses a potential type of overreaching by government against
citizen in general terms. None takes into account the unique concerns that drove the Anti-Federalists
to limit the new federal government’s prospective venture into the world of criminal justice. The
goal of a distinctively “pure” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is to find a theory that achieves
maximum coherence with both the Amendment’s Anti-Federalist underpinnings and the well
developed, and generally well informed, jurisprudence that has grown up around the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. In order to formulate a distinctive jurisprudence for the “pure” Eighth
Amendment, then, it is necessary to re-examine current doctrine and determine how it should be
translated into language the Anti-Federalists would understand.
By taking the principles that have emerged from traditional theories of the Eighth
Amendment, and by distilling these principles through the Anti-Federalist filter of federalism,
popular sovereignty, and collective rights, we can devise at least one principle of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence that applies only in “pure” Eighth Amendment cases. That principle is easy to apply,
commonsensical, and follows almost inexorably from the Anti-Federalist underpinnings of the Bill
of Rights: the federal government may not impose a mode of punishment, including death, within
the bounds of any State in which that mode of punishment is unauthorized by law. Happily, this
principle also coheres with much of contemporary Eighth Amendment jurisprudence while avoiding
some of its pitfalls.
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A.

Re(dis)covering the Eighth Amendment: Abiding the Will of “The People” in
Abjuring “Cruel and Unusual” Modes of Punishment
Again, the basic theme running through the Bill of Rights is the protection of individual

rights through the retention of popular sovereignty and local control.254 Against this backdrop,
consider again the statements of Abraham Holmes and Patrick Henry. The paradigmatic “unusual”
punishments they discussed were those practiced during the Spanish Inquisition and by the major
Continental governments (“France, Spain, and Germany”) more generally.255 The overarching
concern was to prevent the new federal government from devising modes of punishment practiced
on the Continent but unknown to English-speaking peoples, and the newly minted Americans in
particular. Holmes’ and Henry’s statements bespeak a design to allow Congress to use only those
modes of punishment known to English law and, by extension, the laws of the States. That is, State
norms constituted the benchmark for whether a federal punishment was “cruel and unusual.”
An Anti-Federalist view of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on certain modes of
punishment might thus embrace one of several different, increasingly broad propositions. Most
narrowly, one might argue that Congress is prohibited only from implementing modes of punishment
not practiced in the States in 1791. More broadly, one might argue that Congress is additionally
prohibited from implementing modes of punishment practiced generally in the States in 1791 but
which have been later rejected by a national consensus of the States. Finally, one might argue that
Congress is also prohibited from implementing within a particular State modes of punishment not
practiced within that State. It is this last and broadest proposition that is most coherent with both
Anti-Federalist thought and current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
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1.

Option #1: A Prohibition on Imposing Modes of Punishments Not Imposed
in 1791

An Eighth Amendment doctrine that prohibits Congress from imposing only those
punishments not generally imposed in 1791 in the States would be consistent, at least superficially,
with an originalist view of the Eighth Amendment. It would not, however, be consistent with
current Eighth Amendment doctrine. At least since Weems v. United States,256 the Court has
embraced a dynamic rather than a static view of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. The
Court has reiterated many times the plurality’s conclusion in Trop v. Dulles that “[t]he Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”257 While Justices Scalia and Thomas have advocated the view that the Clause’s meaning
was frozen in time in 1791,258 a majority of the Court has never accepted this view. “It is now
beyond serious dispute that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments’
is not a static command.”259 Moreover, even Justices Scalia and Thomas have grudgingly accepted
“evolving standards of decency” as the touchstone.260
In addition, the “evolving standards of decency” standard is probably more coherent with
the true intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the Eighth Amendment than is the Scalia/Thomas
brand of modern originalism.261 The framers and ratifiers of the Eighth Amendment foresaw that
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views on criminal punishments would evolve over time, and it is reasonable to think that they
anticipated that the limitations on Congress would increase accordingly. Take the example of
Pennsylvania. In 1776, that State adopted a new constitution hailed as establishing “the most
democratic of the early state constitutions.”262 One of its distinctive features was its progressive
view on punishments, which was heavily influenced by the reformist views on criminal punishment
of such Enlightenment figures as Montesquieu.263 Section 38 of the new constitution provided:
“The penal laws, as heretofore used, shall be reformed by the future Legislature of this State, as
soon as may be, and punishments made in some cases less sanguinary, and in general more
proportionate to the crimes.”264 True to form, in 1786, Pennsylvania “abolished the death penalty
for robbery, burglary, sodomy and buggery.”265 Then, in 1794, scarcely three years after the Bill of
Rights was ratified, Pennsylvania took the extraordinary step of eliminating the death penalty for
all crimes but first-degree murder.266
A similar movement occurred in Virginia. In 1778, Thomas Jefferson drafted a bill that
would have reserved the death penalty for only the most heinous offenses.267 The Virginia
legislature, following Pennsylvania’s lead, adopted it in 1796.268 Jefferson later pondered the
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“ ripening’” of public opinion in Virginia that was necessary before law reform took root, “ by time,
by reflection, and by the example of Pennsylvania.’”269
Thus, movements were afoot in Pennsylvania and Virginia– two of the three most
populous States in1790270 – to reform criminal punishments, straddling the period during which the
Constitution and Bill of Rights were framed, debated, and ratified. In and of itself, this is powerful
evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the Eighth Amendment knew that the States’ views on
punishment were sure to change over time.271 What is more, however, is that Jefferson, lead
proponent of reform in Virginia, while not a full-blown Anti-Federalist (because he favored
ratification of the Constitution), certainly shared many Anti-Federalist sentiments regarding state
sovereignty, federalism, and a limited national government.272 He later, of course, became the hero
of the Democratic-Republicans, the direct ideological descendents of the Anti-Federalists,273 running
for President on that line in 1796, 1800, and 1804, winning the latter two races.
Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania, the Constitutionalists, the leading defenders of the
progressive 1776 constitution, were later to become known by another moniker: Anti-Federalists.274
Indeed, Judge George Bryan played a pivotal role in the drafting of the constitution.275 Bryan was
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also “the principal leader of the Anti-Federalists in [Pennsylvania],” 276 probable author of the classic
Anti-Federalist essay, “Address of the Minority of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives,”277
and father of, and close collaborator with, Samuel Bryan, who, under the name Centinel, was “[t]he
most prolific and one of the best known of the Anti-Federalist essayists.”278 Accordingly, leading
Anti-Federalists were not only well aware that the penal law was undergoing reform at the time the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was adopted, but some even paved the way for this
reform.279
Given this, is it possible that the Anti-Federalist framers and ratifiers of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause intended that Congress would be limited only to the extent that the
common law limited punishments in 1791? Suppose, for example, that the day after the Bill of
Rights had been adopted, each of the States decided to do away with whipping as a form of
punishment. Assuming agreement that whipping is “cruel” – that is, severe280 – can it really be
argued that Congress would have still been permitted, notwithstanding the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, to impose whipping for federal crimes though the practice had been rendered
“unusual” by dint of its elimination in every single State? To ask the question is to answer it.
Accordingly, a broader conception of a distinctively “pure” Eighth Amendment is necessary.

the Constitution “ was understood to have been principally the work of Mr. George Bryan, in conjunction with a Mr.
Cannon, a schoolmaster.’” Id. (quoting Alexander Graydon, Memoirs of a Life 266 (1811)).
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2.

Option #2: A Prohibition on Imposing Modes of Punishments Abandoned by
a National Consensus Since 1791

Another possible view is that the Eighth Amendment prohibits Congress from imposing,
not only those punishments not generally imposed in 1791 in the States, but also those that were
imposed in 1791 but which have since fallen out of favor according to a national consensus of the
States. This is a more attractive theory, given that it is more consistent with current Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, which has adopted the notion of “evolving standards of decency” and
which looks largely to whether a national consensus has developed against a particular punishment
in order to determine what those standards are.281 Nevertheless, this conception must be rejected as
insufficiently broad to be reflective of the Anti-Federalist underpinnings of the Eighth Amendment.
The Anti-Federalists did not see any significance in “national consensus.” Indeed, if they
had, they would have been ardent supporters of the new Constitution. Rather, they “desire[d] a
continuance of each distinct sovereignty.”282 The Anti-Federalists recognized the diversity among
the States, and favored “the preservation of the individual states.”283 As Brutus wrote:
The United States includes a variety of climates. The productions of the different
parts of the union are very variant, and their interests, of consequence, are
diverse. Their habits and manners differ as much as their climates and
productions; and their sentiments are by no means coincident. The laws and
customs of the several states are, in many respects, very diverse, and in some
opposite . . . .284
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While this was part of an argument against conjoining those diverse areas, some Anti-Federalists
celebrated the diversity among the States, though strictly for instrumentalist reasons. John Francis
Mercer wrote: “A diversity of State-interests, prejudices and parties . . . acting without uniformity
and frequently counteracting each other, leaves the great majority of the Component Members sound
and cool to repress the agitation of a part.”285
The Anti-Federalists’ recognition, if not celebration, of diversity among the States was
most clearly manifested in the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.286 While each State
might have preferred having its own majority sect established as the national religion, the AntiFederalists settled on everyone’s second choice: no federal involvement in religion at all while each
State was free to continue its own established church.287 Again, diversity among the States was seen
by some as instrumental in preserving liberty. As John Francis Mercer again put it: “Parties in
politics, like sects in Religion, can only be divested of their danger by multiplying their number and
diversifying their objects.”288
The Anti-Federalists must have well understood that different States would have different
views of criminal punishment as well. Indeed, the Virginia and Pennsylvania experiences
demonstrate this. Although penal reform occurred at about the same time in those States,289 others
lagged behind, in a pattern that continues to this day: “[V]iews regarding sentencing policy follow
285
Letter from John Francis Mercer to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 27, 1804), reprinted in 5 Storing, supra note
173, at 31 n.35. See also Letter of Agrippa (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted in 4 Storing, supra note 173, at 84 (“A
diversity of produce, wants and interests, produces commerce, and commerce, where there is a common, equal and
moderate authority to preside, produces friendship.”).
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strong and consistent’ regional patterns, with residents of New England demonstrating the greatest
tendency to be lenient and residents of central southern states displaying the least leniency. * * *
These differing viewpoints express themselves in disparate state sentencing laws.”290 Not only must
the Anti-Federalists have recognized that the States’ views on criminal punishment were evolving,
they also must have foreseen that this evolution would take place at different speeds in different
States.291
Moreover, an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that allowed a national consensus to
govern what Congress could do wouldnot lead us to a distinctively “pure” Eighth Amendment
doctrine. Instead, it would merely replicate the existing “incorporated” Eighth Amendment doctrine.
Under current law, a particular mode of punishment is forbidden to the States when a national
consensus against the practice has emerged.292 Presumably, the same would be true if Congress
attempted to impose a punishment that had been rejected by a national consensus. And there is no
reason to think that less of a national consensus would be necessary to show that a punishment is
“unusual” in the latter case than in the former. Indeed, after Atkins v. Virginia293 and Roper v.
Simmons, 294 that hardly seems possible.
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In sum, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause evinces a design to reserve to each
State individually, and not to the States generally, the authority to determine its own norms with
respect to the criminal punishments to be imposed within its borders.
3.

Option #3: A Prohibition on Imposing a Mode of Punishments Within a
State That Does Not Impose That Punishment

What we are left with, then, is a principle coherent with both the Anti-Federalist
underpinnings of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Clause’s more modern
manifestation. That principle dictates that, within the boundaries of a particular State, the federal
government may not inflict a mode of punishment – including the death penalty – that is
unauthorized in that State.
This principle dovetails nicely with Anti-Federalist doctrine. Again, the primary objective
of the Anti-Federalists was the preservation of popular sovereignty through the continued primacy of
the States in those spheres carved out by the Bill of Rights.295 Through the criminal procedure
protections, the Anti-Federalists sought to make it harder for the federal government to investigate,
prosecute, convict, and punish people for crimes, thereby preserving the States’ traditional control
over the criminal law. This would allow the States, for the most part, to maintain control of the
membership of the political community by giving them primary authority to determine, by use of the
criminal sanction, whom would be excluded from the community, in what way, and for how long.
Through the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Anti-Federalists sought to preserve State
prerogatives in setting the outer limits of the severity of the criminal sanction. When placed in this
context, the Clause naturally offers up an interpretation that retains for each State the ultimate
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invasion”).
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authority to decide whether a mode of punishment such as the death penalty will be carried out
within the borders of that State.
This principle reflects a paradigm of the notion of the “marbl[ing] together” in the Bill of
Rights of individual and collective rights. The collective polity’s right to determine the absolute
ceiling on the severity of criminal punishments harmonizes perfectly with the individual citizen’s
right not to be subjected to a level of punishment exceeding that upper limit. The Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause encompasses both these rights. In this way, federalism acts, as was originally
intended, as an additional layer of protection for the rights of individuals.296 The Anti-Federalist
notion of the intimate interconnection between individual and collective rights is vindicated.
In addition, the principle limiting the federal government to those modes of punishment
practiced in each individual State is remarkably coherent with current Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. First, the principle is concerned only with prohibiting certain modes of punishment,
which all agree is one of the core meanings of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. While
Justice Scalia has claimed that “[t]he Eighth Amendment is addressed to always-and-everywhere
cruel’ punishments, such as the rack and the thumbscrew,”297 he has failed to support this ipse dixit
with any authority. Even if one agrees that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause addresses
only modes of punishment, it does not necessarily follow that certain modes of punishment are
forbidden “always[]and[]everywhere,” rather than just sometimes and in some places. The key issue
is whether, in the particular context, the punishment is “unusual.” This is the premise underlying the
Court’s categorical bar cases.
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Moreover, the principle makes use of inter- and intra-jurisdictional analysis, collapsed into
a single inquiry: is the mode of punishment sought by the federal government in a particular
geographic area authorized by the State that exercises jurisdiction over that same area? This inquiry
avoids the two main pitfalls of the Court’s use of inter- and intra-jurisdictional analyses in the
disproportionality and categorical bar cases. First, it is purely objective, as the analyses in these
other contexts can only purport to be. There is no comparison between levels of seriousness of
various crimes, either at the threshold (does a comparison of the punishment to the crime raise an
inference of disproportionality?) or in the intra-jurisdictional analysis (are more serious crimes
punished as severely, or equally serious crimes punished less severely?) of the disproportionality
cases.298
Second, the inquiry is easily answerable. While the inter-jurisdictional analysis of the
disproportionality and categorical bar cases commences as a purely objective counting up of
jurisdictions that do and do not impose the punishment at issue, that is only the beginning of the
inquiry. The Court must also somehow divine whether the States on the prohibitionist side of the
ledger amount to a national consensus.299 By stark contrast, in deciding whether the federal
government can impose a particular type of punishment, a determination of whether the relevant
State authorizes the same type of punishment is both the beginning and the end of the inquiry. If the
State does not imposethattype of punishment, neither can the federal government within that State.
However, if the people of a State have authorized their State agents to impose a mode of punishment
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when they deem it necessary, the federal government may impose it as well, even if the State does so
only rarely.300
In short, this principle posits an active role for the courts in protecting Eighth Amendment
rights, while leaving virtually no judicial discretion, thus reconciling the otherwise irreconcilable
tension in the Court’s current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
B.

Possible Objections to an Anti-Federalist View of the Federal Death Penalty
A number of objections are possible to this reading of the “pure” Eighth Amendment.

First, one might deem it unfair to subject a person in one State to the death penalty for commission of
a federal capital offense, while a similarly situated offender in a State without capital punishment
will not face execution. Relatedly, one might contend that allowing local values effectively to
“reverse preempt” federal law turns the Supremacy Clause on its head. Third, one might argue that
the Sixth Amendment’sJury and Vicinage Clauses are sufficient to inject local values in federal
capital trials even in States that reject the death penalty. Finally, one might contend that the
proposed principle, if taken to its logical limits, would also prohibit the federal government from
punishing any lawbreaker more severely than the State in which the conduct occurred could punish
him for the same conduct. None of these objections seriously detracts from the interpretation of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause proposed here.
1.

National Dis-Uniformity as the Price of Federalism

One might first point to the obvious fact that the reading of the Eighth Amendment
proposed here will lead to different sentences for similarly situated federal offenders, depending on
300
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67

the State in which the crime occurred.301 The goal of achieving national uniformity in the
administration of the death penalty is precisely the reason the current administration has cited for
seeking death in States that do not authorize capital punishment.302 While that goal is admirable,
however, it cannot trump what is the best reading of the Eighth Amendment given its Anti- Federalist
underpinnings. The Constitution, and especially the Bill of Rights, contemplates dis-uniformity on a
national scale. This dis-uniformity is the price we pay for our federal system.303 Moreover, while
the reading of the Eighth Amendment proposed here breeds national dis-uniformity, it furthers local
uniformity: similarly situated offenders within the same State would be treated similarly,
irrespective of whether one is charged with a federal crime and the other is charged with a State
crime.304 It is difficult to think of a good reason why national uniformity is more important than
local uniformity.305
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Calvin Massey has compellingly made a similar argument in a related area. He asserts that
the Ninth Amendment306 was designed to allow States to carve out in their own constitutions
additional rights to be free from federal encroachment, over and above those granted in the Bill of
Rights, which rights are federally enforceable and protected.307 Massey concedes that, on this
reading, the Ninth Amendment could not “be applied uniformly across the country,” and that “some
Americans will enjoy more individual liberty than others.”308 However, he defends this result as
both a descriptive and prescriptive matter: “Such a result is the probable intention of the [N]inth
[A]mendment, part of the legacy of a system of dual sovereignty, and in any case, a virtue. The
citizens of each state would be entitled to define their relationship with all of their governmental
agents.”309 Precisely the same can be said of the Ninth Amendment’s next-door neighbor, the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause.
2.

The Supremacy Clause and “Reverse Preemption”

A related objection would focus on the fact that the principle advocated here seems to turn
the Supremacy Clause310 on its head. It is true that this principle appears to allow a State to, in
effect, “reverse preempt” federal legislation. The answer to this must be a resounding: “So what?”
On an Anti-Federalist reading of the Bill of Rights, one of its purposes is precisely to carve out
306
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certain spheres for State primacy, the Supremacy Clause notwithstanding. To put it another way, the
Supremacy Clause makes supreme only those “Laws of the United States . . . made in Pursuance of”
the Constitution, but a federal law that purports to impose the death penalty within States that do not
authorize capital punishment has not been “made in Pursuance of” the Constitution, but rather in
violation of it, at least in those States.311
Again, Massey’s parallel arguments regarding the Ninth Amendment are compelling. He
notes thatthe Anti -Federalists feared that the Supremacy Clause would grant the central government
“the authority to make its legislation supreme – displacing any contrary state statutory or
constitutional law.”312 Thus, they proposed and ultimately won ratification of the Ninth Amendment
to counteract that authority, at least in part.313 Admitting that his reading of the Ninth Amendment
“is radical stuff” because it “amounts to a form of reverse preemption,”314 Massey contends
persuasively that such a reading is compelled by its “text, history, and structural role in the
Constitution.”315 In the same way, the analysis used here demonstrates that a “situational” Eighth
Amendment, one that might vary State by State, coheres best with the Amendment’s text and history,
the underlying premises of the Anti-Federalists, and existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
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3.

The Impact of the Sixth Amendment Jury and Vicinage Clauses

One might also observe that, if the injection of local values into the sentencing decision is
the goal, then the Jury and Vicinage Clauses are sufficient to the task. Recall that the AntiFederalists, dissatisfied with the jury-trial right already provided in Article III, spent much of their
time, energy, and political capital fighting for an enhanced jury-trial right that would better allow
local sympathies to work on behalf of the defendant.316 If the local community did not believe death
was an appropriate sentence, they could decline to impose it. If, on the other hand, the community
believed death to be appropriate in a federal case, despite its absence as an option at the State level,
the imposition of capital punishment arguably would offend no values of federalism.
One answer to this is that it proves too much, for the same can be said of any of the
criminal procedure protections contained in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. If the Jury and
Vicinage Clauses were sufficient to protect the values of federalism in criminal trials, none of these
provisions would have been necessary. But the Anti-Federalists were not willing to put all their eggs
in the jury box.
The more complete answer is that the argument is anachronistic – it assumes a level of jury
involvement during sentencing that did not exist in 1791. At that time, capital crimes uniformly
carried with them a mandatory death sentence.317 There simply was no discretion to be brought to
bear on the sentence by the jury’s “voice of the community.”318 Jury sentencing in capital cases did
not take hold until about fifty years later319 and even today is not constitutionally required.320 Indeed,
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it is precisely because sentencing generally takes place without input from the jury that the Eighth
Amendment was thought so critical. Just as the Anti- Federalists sought, via the Fourth
Amendment’s restriction on the issuance of warrants, to hem in federal judges when acting without a
jury, so too did they design the Eighth Amendment to constrain those judges when acting alone in
other contexts: when setting bail and when sentencing a defendant.321
Of course, in a capital case, a jury could always acquit against the evidence to spare the
defendant’s life, and a constitutional constraint on punishment might therefore be thought
unnecessary. But jury nullification is a blunt instrument. Certainly, there might be cases in which
the local community would feel that a federal prosecution and conviction of the highest charged
offense were justified, but execution was not. Relying solely on the jury-trial right to give voice to
the community’s sentiments would put the jury in such cases to the difficult choice of sending a man
to the gallows despite community feelings to the contrary or sending the (possibly dangerous)
defendant back into the community, at least when not offered the alternative of conviction of a lesser
offense.
4.

Does the Eighth Amendment Prohibit Disproportionate Federal Punishment?

The most cogent objection to the rule proposed here is based on a “no limiting principle”
argument. If the Eighth Amendment forbids the federal government from imposing modes of
punishment not imposed in the State where the criminal conduct occurred, then, by virtue of the
Amendment’s proportionality component,322 it also forbids the federal government from imposing
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sentences of imprisonment greater than those meted out by that State for the same, or a functionally
equivalent, crime.323 Taken to its logical conclusion, the federal government may not even
criminalize certain conduct within a State if the conduct is not prohibited by that State, since the
State punishment – nothing – will always be less than the federal punishment.
There is no simple answer to this question and this Article does not attempt one. It may be
that the proportionality guarantee that the Court has located in the Eighth Amendment does not really
exist there. Or it may be that the Eighth Amendment does indeed prohibit federal punishments that
exceed State punishments for the same or similar crime committed in the same place. Or, as is most
likely, the Eighth Amendment might generally prohibit the federal government from exacting a
greater sanction than does the State where the crime occurred, but that other factors, such as a clearly
more substantial federal interest or clear evidence of State parochialism, might warrant an exception
to the rule. For example, if a State decided not to criminalize treason at all, the federal government
should still be able to punish the traitor if his treasonous activities take place within that State, for
treason is a quintessentially federal crime. Likewise, if a State decided to punish murder generally
with a mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole, but to punish murder of a federal official
with five years in prison, the federal government need not be bound by the State’s transparently
parochial attempt to de-value the lives of federal officers. Aside from these preliminary thoughts, the
issue is beyond the scope of this Article and remains an area for further study.
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Yet this does not detract from the principle set forth here. All agree that prohibitions on
modes of punishment are directly contemplated by the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, when a State
has ruled out a mode of punishment for even the most serious crimes, there is little danger that it is
acting out of parochial self-interest or not properly taking into account adistinctive ly federal interest.
Rather, it has decided to tie itself to the mast, to impose on itself a constraint with respect to crime
prevention. There can be no surer way to know that a State has rejected a mode of punishment for
reasons sufficient to bind the federal government when acting within its borders than that the
constraint it seeks to impose on the federal government it also imposes on itself.324
CONCLUSION
Donald Fell. Marvin Gabrion. Dustin Honken. Angela Johnson. Gary Sampson. By all
accounts, these are brutal murderers who deserve the harshest sanction allowed by the laws of the
States in which they committed their heinous crimes. However, allfive face a punishment more
severe than those permitted by Statelaw . Each awaits execution on federal death row even though
none of the States in which the crimes occurred permits capital punishment. Alfonso Rodriguez Jr.
might be next.
It would be difficult to conclude that the Anti-Federalists were foes of harsh punishment.
It is unlikely that many of them advocated abolition of the death penalty, or even that they foresaw
that nearly one-quarter of the States would eventually choose that path. What is likely is that, were
they alive today, most of them would shudder at the specter of Fell, Gabrion, Honken, Johnson,
Sampson, and potentially Rodriguez, condemned to die by a powerful central government against
the express policy choice of the people of the States of Vermont, Michigan, Iowa, Massachusetts,
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and North Dakota. And it is doubtful that the Anti-Federalists would view a prohibition of the
federal death penalty in any State that does not authorize capital punishment as some extreme or
extravagant interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
Instead, they would deem such a prohibition to be at that Amendment’s core.

75

